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Employment as Transaction
Rachel S. Arnow-Richman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Revolution is in the air. The corridors of American law schools
are teeming with talk of curricular reform as faculties and administrators across the country contemplate the implications of the Carnegie
1
Report's recent assessment of the quality of legal education. Some of
the criticisms are familiar: graduating law students lack practical ex2
But unlike
perience and an appreciation for professional values.
first to inthe
be
to
poised
stands
Report
Carnegie
past indictments, the
the same
In
pedagogy.'
spire concrete changes in curriculum and
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Associate Professor
of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., Rutgers University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; L.L.M., Temple Law School. Earlier versions of this Article
were presented at the Emory Law School Conference on Teaching Transactional
Skills and Drafting, May 31, 2008, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, August 1, 2008, and the 2008 Employment and Labor Law Colloquium, October 24, 2008. Special thanks to the Colorado Employment Law Faculty
(CELF) Scholarship group, including Roberto Corrada, Melissa Hart, Helen Hunt,
and Martin Katz; and to Richard Bales, Edward Dauer, Steven Davidoff, Colin Crawford, Jose "Beto" Juarez, Martin Malin, Eleanor Myers, Stephen Pepper, Douglas
Scherer, Michael Schwartz, and Eli Wald, all of whom answered questions and supplied helpful feedback on this project. I am grateful for the research assistance of
Brett Martin and Lindsay Noyce and the financial support of the University of Denver's Research Professorship Fund. All errors and deficiencies are my own.
*

I WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF

TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAw (2007)
[hereinafter THE CARNEGIE REPORT].
2 Id. at 126-28. The Carnegie Report's most recent predecessor, the American Bar
Association's "MacCrate Report," similarly concluded that students were wanting in
these fundamental areas. See LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT].
While the MacCrate Report also generated significant discussion within the
it has resulted in only minimal change in legal teaching and curricuacademy,
legal
'lum. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Reform in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295, 307-10 (2006) (discussing that while clinical programs
have expanded as a part of law school curriculum, at most schools they can accommodate only a minority of students); Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REv 475, 478 (2002) (noting
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year as its release, Harvard Law School, the pioneer of the predominant method of law school pedagogy, announced a major curricular
overhaul,4 5 and to date, at least three national law schools have followed suit.

Yet the legal academy has much to consider on the subject of
professional training before picking up the Carnegiegauntlet. Preparation for practice is not a unitary issue. For many of the same reasons that law schools have marginalized skills instruction, they have
also long emphasized litigation preparation at the expense of transactional training.6 This bias persists in the current "skills" curriculum,
which mostly emphasizes brief writing, advocacy, and litigation-based
clinic opportunities.7 The bias also goes wholly unmentioned in the
that most law students will graduate without ever being exposed to transactional
skills); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Desegregatingthe Law School Curriculum: How to Integrate
More of the Skills and Values Identified by the MacCrate Report into a Doctrinal Course, 3
NEV. L.J. 32, 32-33 (2003) (urging more professors to incorporate skills training into
traditional legal courses). See generally THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 190
("[Elfforts to improve legal education have been more piecemeal than comprehensive. Few schools have made the overall practices and effects of their educational effort a subject for serious study. Too few have attempted to address [their] inadequacies on a systematic basis.").
4 The new curriculum features foundational
courses in legislation and regulation and international and comparative law, five delineated upper level "courses of
study," the adoption of a required complex-problem solving course designed to simulate a real life practice situation, and expanded clinical opportunities. See Elaine
McArdle, A Curriculum of New Realities, HARv. LAW BULL. (Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass.), Winter 2008, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2008/
winter/feature_l.php.
5 See Vesna Jaksic, For One Law School, the Third
Year is Getting Real, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 21, 2008, at 1 (reporting that Washington and Lee University School of Law requires all third year law students to participate in legal work with real clients as a replacement for traditional courses); Katherine Mangan, New Hampshire Allows Law
Students to DemonstrateCourt Skills in Lien of Bar Exam, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,July 4,
2008, at 1 (describing a program at Franklin Pierce Law Center in which selected
students take specialized courses during the last two years of law school in which they
take depositions, argue in front of judges, and participate in a mock trial); Lauren
Robel, Letter, IND. L. UPDATE (Univ. of Ind. Sch. of Law, Bloomington, Ind.), July/Aug. 2007, http://www.law.indiana.edu/publications/ilu/200708.html (discussing changes to the curriculum at the Indiana University School of Law requiring first
year students to take a course regarding the "economics and values of the profession").
6 See Fleischer, supra note 3, at 485; Larry T. Garvin,
The StrangeDeath of Academic
Commercial Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 405, 421 (2007); Eleanor W. Myers, Treaching
Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and Practice,47 J. LEGAL EDUC.
401, 405 (1997); Louis N. Schulze, Jr., TransactionalLaw in the Required Legal Writing
Curriculum: An Empirical Study of the Forgotten Future Business Lawyer, 55 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 59, 91-93 (2007).
7 See Edward A. Dauer, Reflections on TherapeuticJurisprudence,
Creative Problem Solving, and ClinicalEducation in the TransactionalCurriculum, 17 ST. THOMAs L. RE\'. 483,
485 (2005) ("Rights-based and public-interest litigation is still the dominant flavor of
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Carnegie Report. Adoption of the Carnegie Report prescription without
careful self-reflection thus risks replicating this long-standing error.
This Article joins a growing body of literature that applies the
traditions of the "Scholarship of Teaching and Learning" movement
to the workings of the legal academy." This Article argues that, as
part of the effort to implement the Carnegie Report, law schools must
specifically address their primordial weakness in preparing students
for transactional practice and posits the basic employment law course
as an appropriate platform for such an initiative. The state of transactional law education has been much lamented by commercial law
and business-oriented faculty,9 and efforts to enhance training in this
area have generally focused on developing skills-focused "deals"
courses or adding skills components to basic contracts and business
law offerings.'0 While such approaches create welcome opportunities
for transactionally-minded students, they do not address the marginalization of transactional thinking within the larger curriculum. Ultimately, transactional skills are not inherently connected to the
business and commercial law fields, but rather are one application of

clinical offerings."); Schulze, supra note 6 (concluding, based on survey of law
schools' curricular offerings and course content, that only slightly over thirty percent
of mandatory legal research and writing courses include transactional drafting). A
noteworthy exception to the predominance of litigation-based skills opportunities is
the Integrated Transactional Practice course offered at Temple University. See
Myers, supranote 6, at 406-07.
8
See ERNEST L. BOYER, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE (1990). The
Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SOTL) is described as an effort to apply the
methods and rigor of scholarship to the workings of the classroom. See MARY TAYLOR
HUBER & PAT HUTCHINGS, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING: BUILDING THE TEACHING COMMONS 18

(2005). For some examples of law school-related work in this tradition, see Andrea
A. Curcio et al., Does PracticeMake Perfect? An EmpiricalExamination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 271 (2008); Larry 0. Natt
Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive Components of the
Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 413 (2007); Alice M. Thomas, Laying the Foundationfor Better Student Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Incorporatingan Integrated Theory of Legal Education into DoctrinalPedagogy, 6 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 49 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 6, at 405, 421; Schulze, supra note 6, at 100; Debra
Progrund Stark, See Jane Graduate: Why Can't Jane Negotiate a Business Transaction? 73
ST. OHN's L. REv'. 477, 487-88 (1999).
See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 491-92 (describing Columbia University
School of Law's "deals program," which includes courses based on simulated transactions and actual deal papers presented by area lawyers); Seth Freeman, Bridging the
Gaps: How Cross-Disciplinary Training with MBAs Can Improve TransactionalEducation,
PrepareStudentsfor PrivatePractice, and Enhance University Life, 13 FORDHAMJ. CORP. &
FIN. L. 89, 95 (2008) (urging programs in which law students work with business students to enhance skills involving corporate negotiations).
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a broader theory of preventive law practice." In this respect, they reflect a type of service that any well-trained lawyer ought to be able to
provide-structuring a relationship consistent with client intent while
minimizing future risk-regardless of the legal discipline. To train
students to perform this type of service, law school faculty in all substantive law areas need to seek out the transactional aspects of their
fields of expertise and leverage those teachable moments across the
curriculum. In a twist on the old adage, it is law professors who must
be retrained to think like lawyers.
Employment law is an area well suited to advancing this goal. In
recent decades, the employment law field has migrated away from its
public law tradition toward a model in which private ordering holds
significant sway. State courts appear to be rolling back the progress
employees made in asserting breach of contract claims in the early
1980s by treating employer-drafted disclaimer language as dispositive
of employees' at-will status. 12 Under employment discrimination laws,
courts now examine employer efforts to prevent and respond to
unlawful behavior in assessing vicarious liability 13 and consistently
route statutory claims to private arbitration based on ordinary con-

1 Preventive law practice aims to "help their clients achieve their personal
or or-

ganizational or familial or corporate goals, by optimizing the arrangements that are
relevant to those goals and by minimizing the chance that the purpose is confounded with unnecessary legal risks." Edward A. Dauer, Preventive Law Before and After TherapeuticJurisprudence,5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 800, 801 (1999); see also Dennis P. Stolle et al., IntegratingPreventive Law and TherapeuticJurisprudence:A Law and
Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REv,. 15, 16 (1997); see infra Part
II.C. See generally Myers, supra note 6, at 406 ("'[T]ransactional teaching' is not a
question of subject matter ....Rather we use the term to signal a perspective shift...
. We encourage students, first, to assume the viewpoint of the actors and their lawyers rather than that of impartial decision-makers and, second, to look at the transaction as it unfolds, not after it has become a problem.").
12 See, e.g., Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
139 P.3d 56, 59 (Cal. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for employer on plaintiffs breach of implied job security contract
claim based on "terminable at-will" proviso in unilaterally drafted offer letter despite
employer promises of long-term employment and practice of terminating workers
only for cause); Levitan v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. CV795189, 2003 LEXIS 3972,
at *2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., April 18, 2003) (affirming summary judgment for
employer based on terminable at-will language in unilaterally drafted offer letter despite express promise by human resources manager during hiring process that plaintiff could retain residence outside of state and commute to work); see also infra Part
II.B.1.
13 See Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (recognizing affirmative defense to liability where employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct harassing behavior and that unreasonably failed to take advantage of
employer's preventative or corrective procedures); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (same); infra Part III.B.1.
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tract principles. 4 Along with these doctrinal developments, employers are becoming more aware of personnel matters as an area of liability exposure that must be managed and controlled. Companies
routinely require starting employees to sign form documents, such as
arbitration agreements and covenants not to compete,15 and it has
become standard practice for companies to maintain formal policies
6
on everything from sexual harassment to dispute resolution. " Employment law scholarship too has recognized the broadening trend,
citing the internal compliance behavior of employers as an important
site of scholarly inquiry.17 Thus, an emerging body of literature has
begun to theorize the role of corporate actors and their agents, parlawyers, in achieving the normative goals of workplace
ticularly their
18
regulation.
As of yet, however, there has been little to no assessment of how
these interrelated developments in employment law scholarship, jurisprudence, and practice affect the domain of the classroom. This
See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding employment contracts to be "transactions involving commerce" subject to the Federal Arbitration Act
unenforceable only on grounds recognized under general state contract law); see in14

fra Part III.B.
15
I have described this trend in several prior articles. See generally Rachel ArnowRichman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment
Agreements, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 637 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed
Term]; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of
Employee BargainingPower Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 963
(2006) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility].
16 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold
Court:
Speculations on the OrganizationalInternalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 941, 976
(1999) (describing employers' internal implementation of "private legal systems" to
address workplace disputes); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061,
2122 (2003) (describing employers' wide-spread and aggressive use of sexual harassment policies).
17 See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal RationalMyths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 903, 908 (1996)
(describing emergence of new institutionalist perspective in organizational analysis
and its relationship to law and society scholarship); Michelle Travis, Lashing Back at
the ADA, 76 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 48-50, on file with author) (describing the "new institutionalist" agenda in employment law scholarship);
see infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and PrivateProcess: Toward an Incentivized OrganizationalJustice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers,2007 UTAH
L. REV. 25 (2007); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myths, 105 AMER. J. Soc. 406 (1999); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319
(2005); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise Of Governance in
ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Schultz, supra note 16; Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM.
L. REv. 458 (2001); Travis, supra note 17.
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Article fills that gap. It calls for 'the redeployment of the basic employment law course as a skills-doctrine hybrid that integrates the
analytical and applied aspects of transactional lawyering through
practice-focused exercises and discussion. In so doing, it offers a pedagogical prescription that embraces the crisis in transactional training, the legacy of recent developments in employment law and practice, and at least a subset of the challenges identified in the Carnegie
19
Report.

The Article proceeds as follows: Part II sets out the key challenges facing legal education, intersecting the recommendations of
the Carnegie Report with the long-standing curricular divide between
advocacy work and transactional law practice in the legal academy.
Part III examines the state of employment law in the curriculum and
on the books, demonstrating that the field is ripe for creative reform
showcasing the growing transactional dimensions of the practice.
Part IV implements the Article's theoretical contribution, offering a
concrete illustration of the use of transactional law pedagogy in the
employment law course. Finally, Part V offers preliminary thoughts
on the future of the law school curriculum and the "Scholarship of
Teaching and Learning" with an eye toward encouraging and supporting creative and integrative law school teaching.
II.

SKILLS VERSUS DOCTRINE, AND OTHER

(TRUE AND FALSE) CURRICULAR DIVIDES
The 2007 CarnegieReport offers a serious critique of what goes on

in our law schools. 20 Principal among the concerns raised by the Carnegie Report is the lack of instruction in the important area of practical

19

This Article focuses specifically on the Carnegie Report's recommendations on

integrating practical training. It does not directly address the Carnegie Report's parallel critique and recommendations concerning law schools' treatment of professional
values. However, invoking realistic practice situations in the classroom inevitably
leads to questions about professionalism and ethics. See Myers, supra note 6, at 41119 (describing how simulated transactions create a rich context for raising and exploring questions of professional responsibility). In that respect, such issues are addressed here as well, albeit less comprehensively.
20 THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. A similar and somewhat more

proscriptive
exploration of the subject can be found in the Clinical Legal Education Associations
report published shortly after the release of the Carnegie Report. See Roy STAcKEY ET
AL., CLINICAL LEGAL EDuc. Ass'N, BEST PRAInCES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [here-

inafter CLEA]. Because the Carnegie Report was first in time and seems to have more
thoroughly infiltrated the legal academy's consciousness, I refer principally to its
pronouncements while recognizing that others have identified and thoughtfully presented similar concerns about the state of legal education.
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training.21 Schools do well preparing students to think like lawyers,
but they do little to assist them in being lawyers.
This assessment, while accurate and valuable, oversimplifies the
challenges facing legal education in one significant respect. The22
of practice,
CarnegieReport's characterization of the "apprenticeship
and its calls for reform within the legal academy accept the implicit
but institutionally pervasive construct of the lawyer as a legal advocate
principally concerned with the resolution of disputes. The Carnegie
Report does not consider the degree to which essential components of
cognitive learning as well as practical skills-those necessary to a
transactionally-focused practice-are not merely segregated from
mainstream doctrinal instruction but largely unrepresented in any
aspect in the current curriculum.
This Part sets forth the principal findings of the Carnegie Report
before turning to the special problem of transactional skills training.
Transactional skills, and indeed transactional thinking, have been
marginalized within the legal academy owing to the supremacy of the
institution's public law focus, a decline in business and commercial
law teaching and scholarship, and, most fundamentally, a misunderstanding of the nature of transactional practice. Contrary to the prevailing view of transactional planning as a distinctly private law competency, transactional skills and thinking are inherent components of
a general legal practice, broadly applicable to all substantive disciplines. This Part concludes by drawing on the scholarship of preventive law theory to build a foundation for a new "pedagogy of practice"
that will further the Carnegie Report's goal of enhancing practical
training and will address the legal academy's particular weaknesses in
preparing students for transactional practice.
An IntellectualSuccess, a PracticalFailure

A.

In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching issued its much awaited report on the state of American legal education. The Foundation's conclusions are at best mixed and
at worst an indictment of serious and long-neglected shortcomings in
the current system.
Law schools get high marks in the first of three identified "apprentices" to professional competence-the transmission of cognitive
22
The Carnegie Report credits law schools' signature pedaknowledge.
21 THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 77; CLEA, supra note 20, at 16-18.
22
23

THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
Id. (using the concept of "apprenticeship" as a "metaphor [extending] to the

whole range of imperatives confronting professional education . . . [which are to
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gogy, the Socratic dialogue, with quickly inculcating students into the
art of legal thinking. 24 In short order, entering law students learn to
parse and evaluate cases, articulate and apply legal rules, identify and
categorize legal issues, and formulate and counter legal arguments.'
In this respect, the CarnegieReport deems the structure of legal education a relative success. 26
From there, things deteriorate quickly. Law schools do not carry
through on the two remaining apprenticeships: the pedagogies of
practice and of professional identity. 27 With respect to the former,

the standard curriculum provides limited skills instruction in a few
discrete (and often optional) courses typically taught by faculty of
lower academic status than the so-called substantive faculty.2 s Stu-

dents are not exposed to the "shadow pedagogy" of learning in context; they are only infrequently taught through the perspective of clients in real or simulated cases.2 9 In this way, law school differs
markedly from other institutions of advanced professional learning,
such as medical school where patient contact and clinical experience
is a principal site of learning early on and throughout students' matriculation.3 0 As a result, law students graduate ill-equipped to handle
the complexity of client-centered situations and are unsure how to respond to practical exigencies, as well as moral concerns, that do not

prepare students] to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves like professionals").
24 See id. at
185-86.
25 See id.
at 186.
26 See id. (concluding that law schools' ability to take students from
"a wide variety
of social backgrounds and undergraduate experiences" and teach them to "'think
like a lawyer ...is an accomplishment of the first order that deserves serious consideration from educators... [in] other professional fields").
27 See id. at
28-29.
28 See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 87-88.
2
See id. at 56-57.
30 See id. at 57 (likening the omission to
training doctors by focusing instruction
on disease process rather than patient care); Fleischer, supra note 3, at 483 ("New
lawyers do not know how to swim on their own; they have studied the backstroke, the
breaststroke, the crawl, and the butterfly, but they haven't spent any time in the water.").
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fit within the formal legal schema." In short, graduates
32
professionals.
than
rather
students
like
school thinking
This is by no means a novel observation. The American Bar Association's 1992 MacCrate Report similarly faulted law schools in the
key areas of lawyering skills and professionalism, as the Carnegie Report
acknowledges. 3 But the Carnegie Report brings to light an important
additional dimension to the problem: the lack of integration between
law schools' existing instruction in skills and professionalism and the
core cognitive apprenticeship that dominates students' legal education. 34 A hallmark of the successful professional is the ability to integrate and bring to bear multiple competencies-expert knowledge,
practical experience, and moral judgment-in circumstances of uncertainty and complexity. In this way, efforts to invigorate training in
skills and professionalism through a strategy of adding supplemental
courses, the dominant institutional response to the MacCrate Report,
have missed the mark.5 According to the Carnegie Report, what is
needed is an "integrative" rather than "additive" approach to curricular reform, one that appreciates and imparts the holistic nature of
professional expertise. 6
The TransactionalThinking Gap

B.

So far, so good. But what are the essential skills and practical
knowledge that must be integrated into the doctrinal curriculum?
The Carnegie Report, as a study in teaching and learning, is principally
31 As the Carnegie Report explains, the case dialogue method is a "deliberate sim-

plification ... [consisting] in the abstraction of the legally relevant aspects of situations and persons from their everyday contexts.... By contrast, the task of connecting ... [legal] conclusions with the rich complexity of actual situations that involve
full-dimensional people, let alone the job of thinking through the social consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusions, remains outside the method." THE

supra note 1, at 187.
Id. at 188 ("The result [of the lack of direct training in professional practice] is
to prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather than an apprenCARNEGIE REPORT,
32

tice practitioner....").
Id. at 189.
See id. at 58-59 (noting that while "practical courses in lawyering and clinicallegal education make an essential contribution to responsible professional training..
. [b]ecause case-dialogue teaching is seldom explicitly connected with clinical teaching, few law schools achieve the full impact that an integrated ensemble [experience]
could provide").
35 See id. at 189-90. The Carnegie Report favorably excepts particular initiatives at a
few schools including New York University and City University of New York. Id. at
197. Another important counter-example is the Integrative Transactional Program
at Temple University. See Myers supra note 6, at 406-07 (describing Temple's program).
36 THE CARNEGIE Report, supra note 1, at 191.
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concerned with assessing the existing pedagogy of legal education
and recommending sites of reform. It tells us relatively little about
what an integrative curriculum actually looks like, and even less about
the content of any of its components.
Yet the CarnegieReport does not write on a clean slate. Its understanding of the apprenticeship of practice is informed by what is currently taught in the prototypical law school curriculum. That curriculum, as reflected both in its cognitive dimensions and its modest
practical components, has long espoused a particular view of the lawyer-as an advocate whose principal function is to advance legal
rights and defend legal positions in the context of an existing or imminent dispute.3 7 The analytical processes associated with case explication and legal argument-the aspects of professional competence
that the Carnegie Report credits schools with successfully impartingare the building blocks for an advocacy practice. In the event of litigation (or adjudication in an alternative forum), the lawyer will apply
these analytical processes to such things as drafting a brief, preparing
a position statement, arguing a motion or appeal, or crafting a closing argument. In the event of negotiation and settlement, the same
competencies are transferable to valuing the case (which is dependent on the likelihood of success on the merits if adjudicated) and
persuading opposing counsel of one's position (which requires delivering many of the same arguments that would be made at such a proceeding).3

The problem with the advocacy perspective is not, as some have
put it, that most cases are not litigated, but rather that most "cases"
are not cases. The daily work of a transactional lawyer involves structuring deals and drafting documents. Rather than dealing with disputes, he or she architects relationships. While there is some consensus within the legal academy that law schools do a reasonable job of
preparing students in the advocacy tradition, it is widely agreed that
law schools do little to groom students for their roles as counselors in

37 See Tina L. Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54

J.

LEGAL. EDuc. 223, 223

(2004) ("Although the academy prides itself on teaching students to think like a lawyer, for the most part we teach students to think like litigators."). I use the term "advocate" rather than litigator to embrace any and all aspects of a lawyer's practice that
involve a dispute, even if the problem does not lead to litigation.
s8 Id. at 224 ("[In first-year courses] we teach students to take the
law and apply it
to the facts to create a persuasive argument. That argument is then memorialized in
a brief or a memo or is otherwise used to sway another, be it the other party or the
court.").
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a planning and compliance-oriented practice. 39 This long-standing
neglect suffuses the curriculum as a whole and, by some accounts, is
worsening. Since the mid-1960s, there has been a documented drop
in law schools' doctrinal offerings in the field of commercial law,
which, along with corporate law courses, is widely viewed as the core
of a substantive transactional curriculum.40 Commercial law scholarship also is decreasing in prevalence and, according to some, has suffered a decline in prestige. 41 The number of faculty with expertise in
the area is dwindling; many are nearing retirement and few newcom42
ers to the legal academy are taking up the field. Faced with the inability to staff the three core courses of a vibrant commercial law curriculum-sales, secured transactions, and payment systems-law
schools have struggled with the viability of a general commercial law
course touching on all three.43
The situation is even bleaker on the "skills" side of the curriculum. Whereas doctrinal offerings are evaporating, practice-oriented
courses and clinical offerings designed to train students as transactional lawyers by-and-large never existed. The development of clinical education came on the heels of the "access to justice" movement
of the late 1960s, and most clinics continue to focus on representing
the indigent in public proceedings." Along the same lines, first-year
writing courses typically create contextual opportunities for students
to research cases and statutes, draft briefs and research memos, and
prepare and participate in simulated oral arguments-all hallmark
functions of a legal advocate.45 Many schools offer advanced lawyering skills courses as part of the upper-level elective curriculum; yet
See e.g., Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: EducatingLawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7 (1995); Fleischer, supYra note 3,
39

at 478 (noting that most law students will graduate without ever being exposed to
transactional skills); Noble-Allgire, supra note 3, at 32-33 (urging more professors to
incorporate skills training into traditional legal courses); Stark, supra note 37, at 232
(noting that students have "little opportunity to get a thorough grounding in business before they leave law school," putting them "behind the curve" when they start
deals practice).
40 See Garvin, supra note 6, at 412-13
& n.17.
41 Id. at 415-16.
42 Id. at 406-08 (comparing number of faculty in commercial law field to those in
criminal law and intellectual property over a forty-year period).
43 Whether such compressed exposure offers a meaningful survey of the field is a
question that has dogged commercial law faculty; and employment faculty considering the adoption of a comprehensive work law class might take heed.
Dauer, supra note 7, at 485 ("In a substantial number of schools, the clinic was
first a way of pursuing social justice .. .and[,] secondly, an opportunity for teaching."); Fleischer, supra note 3, at 485.
45See Schulze, supra note 6.
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these are commonly concentrated in areas such as trial advocacy, advanced legal writing, and mediation and negotiation. Certainly some
of these courses benefit the student bound for transactional practice
(negotiation, for instance, is an inter-disciplinary skill), but at many,
if not most, law schools there are few to no courses geared toward developing transactional-specific competencies. 46
Efforts to address the underselling of transactional law have generally reflected the additive model criticized in the Carnegie Report.
Many propose or presume the existence of a skills-focused, nondoctrinal course, such as a transactions "lab" or capstone experience
in which students
study real deal documents or execute simulated
•
41
transactions. Such courses deserve praise for providing a contextual
learning experience for students that approximates closely the actual
practice of transactional law. 48 But they cannot fill the deficit on their
own. As the CarnegieReport suggests, segregated instruction teaches
students that practical skills are discrete from and secondary to the
analytical apprenticeship and fails to construct the critical bridge between competencies essential to expert professional practice.
Even more problematic in the context of the legal academy's
particular failures in transactional training, an additive approach
leaves intact the existent doctrinal paradigm, which itself creates an
untenable dichotomy between substantive transactional law and the
mainstream doctrinal curriculum. Just as law schools have compartmentalized skills and doctrine within their curriculum, they have also
cultivated an informal divide between "public" and "private" law
courses with business and commercial law frequently equated with
the latter. Such distinctions are questionable in the modern regulatory state, in which government intervention into all areas of human
life, including business and commerce, is pervasive, 49 and the public/private divide has been widely criticized from a legal theory perA notable exception is the Integrated Transactional Program at Temple University, which combines trusts and estates, professional responsibility, and transactional skills training in a ten-credit, year-long program consisting of two to three credits of substantive law instruction and two to three credits of skills and simulations
each semester. See Myers, supra note 6, at 406-07. This program is unique not only
for its transactional focus, but for its efforts to truly integrate cognitive and applied
learning. See infra Part V.A.
47 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at
490-92.
4
See id. at 492-93 (explaining that deals classes offer students a leg up by showing them what business lawyers actually do).
49 It is worth noting that the trading of securities, which forms
the backbone of
our economy, is intensely regulated at the federal level and that, in response to the
2007 collapse in the sub-prime mortgage market, a significant and more expansive
regulatory overhaul of financial markets appears to be in the offing.
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spective.5 ° It is more useful when planning curriculum, particularly
skills instruction, to leave aside such theoretical concepts and focus
on the kinds of skills and analysis on which different types of legal
problems will draw-that is, whether a particular matter requires the
lawyer to effectuate a client's goal or intention ex ante, or whether it
interaction,
requires her to unravel the consequences of a particular
51

which may or may not have been planned previously.

Viewed from this functional perspective, almost all legal disciplines lend themselves to both transactional and advocacy practice.
Business and commercial transactions obviously give rise to litigated
disputes. Advocates as much as "deal" lawyers must know the substantive law of real estate, secured transactions, business associations, and
a host of other "private law" courses in dealing with the downstream
consequences of preexisting transactions. On the flip side, all areas
of law, including those traditionally considered "public law" fields,
provide a set of external rules and limitations that shape individual
behavior and can be leveraged by lawyers in planning future transactions. Doctrinal faculty routinely ask students to craft arguments for
the application of rules to existing disputes-an essential exercise in
anticipation of preparing a brief or oral argument for a matter in litigation. Only rarely, however, do they ask students to plot a course of
action that will insulate a client from disputes ex ante.52 An ethically
troubling hypothetical from a quintessentially public law field offers a
powerful example. Imagine a high-level organized crime figure
wishes to orchestrate a bank robbery. Knowledgeable about criminal
law and concerned about himself and other principals, he consults a
lawyer about how to best structure the heist so as to reduce the risk of
criminal conspiracy liability. While the rules of the profession and
common sense dictate that no lawyer should provide this type of ad50
Much of the criticism centers on the claim that "public" and "private" represent ideological labels rather than a substantive framework for analysis. See Duncan
Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349, 1351-52 (1982). For a critique of the distinction in the labor law context, see
Karl E. Klare, The Public/PrivateDistinctionin Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1360
(1982).
51 See Myers, supra note 6, at 406 (describing the difference between a transactional perspective and a more traditional litigation focus as looking at a legal matter
.as it unfolds, not after it has become a problem").
52 Cf Stark, supra note 9, at 484 (noting that asking students questions such as
"how the attorneys representing the parties in the case may have been able to avoid
the dispute by better structuring and negotiating the terms of the transaction" and
"how the parties could have drafted the legal documents for a more favorable ruling
from the court being asked to give effect to their agreements" can achieve the goal of
introducing basic transactional skills into a substantive property or real estate
course).
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vice, it may be fair to say that all lawyers should have the underlying
skill set necessary to formulate it.
In sum, the transactional thinking gap is about more than just
skills and transactional courses. What is missing from the curriculum
is not merely the opportunity to draft documents or negotiate deals,
but exposure to a transactional mindset-a framework for viewing
the law as a factor in planning interactions and managing risk, rather
than in resolving disputes and crafting arguments. In other words,
when it comes to preparation for transactional practice, law schools
not only fail to provide a meaningful apprenticeship of practice, but
they also fall short in developing its core analytical underpinnings. In
that recognition lie both a challenge and the hope of a cure. Transactional competency cannot evolve purely from skills instruction in a
specialized course, but neither does it depend on the quality of a
school's substantive infrastructure for teaching business and commercial law doctrine. Put another way, any class-skills or doctrinal,
public law or private law-has the potential to be an integrative
"deals" class.
C. Enhancingthe Pedagogiesof Knowledge and Practice:
A TransactionalPerspective
To implement the teachings of the Carnegie Report with an eye
toward rectifying the particular problems of law schools' transactional
curriculum requires some further explication of what transactional
lawyers do and, more importantly, how they think. 3 At the most basic level, the critical skills for successful business lawyering are the
ability to understand transactions and prepare the corresponding
deal documents. Professor Tina Stark describes this competency as
the ability to translate client needs into legal form, and her work sets
out a viable pedagogy for teaching this skill.- 4 She proposes that students learn to abstract deal-specific issues into five broader categories
common to all business transactions-provisions related to money,
risk, control, quality standards, and ending the deal 55-and then use
the "building blocks" of representations, warranties, covenants, and

53 Victor Fleischer has noted that students bound for business
law practice "finish
law school with only the vaguest notion of what they will be doing." Fleischer, supra
note 3, at 492. 1 fear that many law professors suffer from the same ignorance.
54 Stark, supra note 37, at 224 ("The lawyer
must ...find the contract concepts
that best reflect the business deal and use those concepts as the basis of drafting the
contract provisions. I call this skill 'translating the business deal into contract con-

cepts."').
5

Id. at 229-32 (describing five-prong framework for identifying business issues).
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56
conditions to compose the requisite contract. This framework captures the core skill of drafting deal documents to memorialize a negotiated understanding, and it has the advantage of generalizing to
all business and commercial transactions regardless of the substance
of the deal.
However, underlying those functions, there is also a critical analytical process that reaches beyond business and commercial practice
altogether. Transactional lawyering can be broadly understood to
encompass the optimal structuring of private relationships, regardless
of who the actors are and whether or not a written document flows
from their arrangement. 57 The scholarship of preventive law provides
a theoretical groundwork for understanding the cognitive component of this universal competency. Perhaps best understood as a theory of practice, 58 preventive law emphasizes the lawyer's role as a
planner and facilitator.59 Her aim is to achieve the client's goals in a
way that enhances opportunities for gain and minimizes legal risk
and other potential liabilities. 60 From a preventive law perspective,
the lawyer's role is to generate options and facilitate choice rather
than to advance a particular position!" Preventive law is also distinctly proactive and client-centered. 62 The model envisions the lawyer and client jointly engaged in formulating a comprehensive legal
longstrategy not limited to one earmarked issue, but contemplating
6
3
nature.
in
legal
strictly
not
are
that
goals
term risks and

56 Id. at 225.
57 This description

of transactional practice leaves aside for the moment the
by the lawyer in any particular structure, a subject that
added
value
question of the
has received significant attention in transactional law scholarship. See, e.g., Ronald
Gilson, Value Creation l Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE LJ. 239
(1984). Here, this Article's aim is to link the work that transactional lawyers do to an
underlying cognitive theory that can be taught in the classroom. This Article returns
to the concept of value added infra Part JV.C.
58 Cf BOYER, supra note 8, at 21-23 (describing "the scholarship of application" as
the process by which the scholar responsibly applies knowledge to consequential
problems in furtherance of the goals of individuals and institutions, and allows social
problems to define an agenda for scholarly investigation).
59 See Stolle et al., supra note 11.
60 Dauer, supra note 11, at 801 ("The objective of lawyers practicing [preventive
law] has been to help their clients achieve their personal or organizational or familial
or corporate goals, by optimizing the arrangements that are relevant to those goals
and by minimizing the chance that the purpose is confounded with unnecessary legal
risks.").
Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH.
U. L. REV. 685, 691-92 (1981) ("It is the counselor's function to help clients make
informed rational choices among alternative courses of conduct.").
62 Stolle et al., supra note
11.
61

6

Id.

HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 461 2009

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:447

Owing in part to the influence of therapeutic jurisprudence on
preventive law theory, these aspects of the practice are often framed
in psychological terms." In particular, preventive law contemplates
that legal disputes are animated by feelings of loss or injury occasioned by a breach of expectation.6 ' Thus, to secure against risk, the
preventive lawyer must predict human behavior as much as legal results. 66

Along the same lines, the theory recognizes that legal tools

are not the only, nor always the best, mechanisms of dispute avoidance, and that personal intervention and creative problem solving are
at times superior responses. 7 In this respect, preventative law shares
much in common with relational contract theory, which posits that
contracting parties' actions and expectations are strongly informed
by relational norms, and that the precise terms of agreement serve
primarily as a backstop in situations of relational breakdown. For all
of these reasons, preventive law suggests that it rarely is efficient (and
at times it is counterproductive) to attempt the elimination of all legal risk. 6.

These insights offer a useful framework for teaching the cognitive dimensions of transactional lawyering. They also address a key
C, Therapeutic jurisprudence is a body of scholarship concerned
with the psychological consequences of legal rules and practice, it also has significant applications in
the medical field. Id. at 17 (describing therapeutic jurisprudence as "an interdisciplinary approach to law that builds on the basic insight that law is a social force that
has inevitable (if unintended) consequences for the mental health and psychological
functioning of those it affects."). The synergies between preventive law and therapeutic jurisprudence are explored in a number of articles. See, e.g., Dauer, supra note
11, at 801; Stolle et al., supra note 11, at 18-20; Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler,
TherapeuticJurisprudence and Preventive Law: A Combined Concentration to Invigorate the
Eve2day Practiceof Law, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 23, 27 (1997).
See Edward A. Dauer, FourPrinciplesfora Theory of Preventive Law, in A PROAcTIvE
APPROACH TO CONTRACTING AND LAW 17 (Helena Haapio ed., 2008).
66

Id.

See, e.g., id. at 28-30 (providing the example of a hospital
that managed its risk
of liability to transfusion patients who may have acquired Hepatitis from contaminated blood with a strategy based on "compassion, acceptance of responsibility...
attention to immediate needs, full disclosure and never letting the patient feel abandoned" as less costly than pursuing vigorous negligence defenses in inevitable lawsuits).
68 The term "relational contract" refers to the notion that the behavior
and expectations of contracting parties are heavily influenced by a desire to preserve their
relationship and foster cooperative behavior. See generally IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW
SOcIAL CONTRACT (1980); Jay M. Feinman, RelationalContract Theory in Context, 94 NW.
U. L. REv. 737 (2000); CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internaland External, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 340 (1983). The connection to preventive law is addressed in
DAUER, supra note 65, at 24.
0 DAUER, supra note 65, at 27-28.
67
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objection of the Carnegie Report to the current substantive pedagogy
by acknowledging the role of non-legal needs and interests in client
7 ° Prebehavior and legitimizing them within the lawyer's practice.
1
ventive theory humanizes transactional work. Its principles are as
applicable to preparing a will or prenuptial agreement with an individual client as to papering a commercial real estate transaction or a
corporate merger or acquisition. At the same time, preventive law
recognizes that moral, personal, relational, and other non-legal, nonfinancial concerns permeate all economic undertakings-including
business transactions. Most importantly, preventive law stresses the
importance of creative foresight and problem solving that at times
reaches outside the legal framework and ultimately may fall short of
otherwise optimal legal solutions. Thus, the foundational cognitive
and applied skills of transactional practice, broadly construed, can be
summarized as follows: the ability to uncover and understand multidimensional goals and incentives; the ability to intuit areas of risk and
foresee potential negative consequences, legal and behavioral; and
finally, taking these considerations into account, the ability to execute the appropriate legal strategy, whether by contract drafting or
other mechanisms.
III. CLAIMING EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE TRANSACTIONAL
LAw CURRICULUM (AND VICE VERSA)

Part II argued that preparation for transactional practice must
be a centerpiece of any curricular reform efforts in the wake of the
Carnegie Report, and it outlined the type of skills and cognitive processes that must be transmitted to students. The next step is to identify a means of integrating these components of professional training
into the curriculum. Ultimately, it is the contention of this Article
that, consistent with its broad definition of transactional practice,
such learning can and should take place in all manner of doctrinal
courses. However, employment law is one substantive area of law that
is particularly suited to the task. This Part explains why.
It begins with a survey of the state of work law in the legal academy. A significant decline in union density, coupled with the ascendance of federal discrimination law, has resulted in uncertainty about
the role of the basic employment law course in the current curriculum, leaving the field fertile for a new organizing framework. The
See supra Part II.A.
Dauer, supra note 7, at 484 ("[Students should] understand that even in commercial matters people have real feelings about what they are doing and that feelings
are just as much facts as widgets and dollars and documents are facts.").
70
71
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Part then turns to emerging developments in employment law doctrine, practice, and scholarship-all of which suggest the increasing
importance of private planning in assessing rights and liabilities in
the workplace. Courts and scholars alike are examining employers'
compliance and prevention efforts, both as a litmus test for legal obligation and as a means of understanding the normative reach of the
law. It therefore makes sense for the employment law course similarly to showcase the transactional aspects of the field. This Part concludes with a series of examples illustrating the prevalent role transactional planning plays in employment practice and offers some
cautionary words about integrating transactional skills while maintaining a diversely focused and ideologically balanced course.
A.

From Labor Law to Work Law: Trends in Teaching and
Curriculum

Employment law is facing a modest identity crisis. Historically,
the study of workplace relationships in the legal academy concentrated on the role of unions and collective action. During the Lochner
era and its aftermath, labor relations was the critical context in which
constitutional questions about the reach of private contract were contested.72 For this reason, the field was a foundation of the public law
curriculum. 73

Since then, social and doctrinal developments have entirely altered the legal landscape. Unions represent a mere twelve percent of
the workforce, and the majority of protections afforded by the National Labor Relations Act are irrelevant to most workers. 74 "Traditional" labor law, as it has come to be called, is an increasingly insular
specialty, and employment lawyers can maintain a busy practice with-

72 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Reflections
on the Declining Prestige of American Labor Law
Scholarship,23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 789, 790 (2002) ("[L]abor law was the primary
battleground for this great constitutional conflict, for legislative efforts to regulate
the terms of the labor contract posed the most direct challenge to the reigning constitutional construct of 'liberty of contract.'").
73 See id. at 791 ("[T]he Wagner Act
and its constitutional vindication seemed to
promise, and to some extent delivered, ajust and peaceable resolution to 'the labor
question,' which had plagued American society for generations. There was no doubt
that the scholars and the scholarship that played a part in bringing about that resolution were at the very center of the public agenda.").
74 The 2008 statistics indicate that union
member comprise 7.6 percent of private
sector workers, 36.8 percent of public sector workers, and 12.4 percent of combined
public and private sector workers. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2008, at 1 (Jan. 28, 2009) available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
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handling a labor law case or even referencing that body of
out 7ever
5
law.

This invites questions about the best way to package employment
law instruction for students aspiring to the field. Notably, labor law
itself has not changed; indeed, the absence of any meaningful reform
to the labor law architecture is perhaps the principal complaint of
contemporary labor law scholars.76 Thus, to the extent it continues to
be offered, 7 the traditional labor law course does not necessarily require significant reform.78 Rather, what is needed is an organizing
principle for the ever-growing body of law that has developed outside
of the labor law regime, as well as a means of relating it to its histori79
cal foundations.
The legal academy's response to this challenge was, in most cases, the development of a stand-alone employment law course and,
subsequently, the spinning off of antidiscrimination law into yet another specialized employment law class.8 0 This has worked well
enough for teaching antidiscrimination law, which comprises a discrete set of statutes all embracing common doctrinal proof structures
and recurring themes. The problem, which is well known to those
who teach in the area, is what to do with the remaining body of employment law, which is anything but discrete. In contrast to tradi75

See Steven L. Willborn, Labor Law Without Labor, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 547, 548

(1988) (reviewing

MARK

A.

ROTHSTEIN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT

LAW (1st ed. 1987)) ("[Tjhe labor law that is important outside of the law schools is
labor law without labor-laws regulating wages and hours, providing for workers'
and unemployment compensations, prohibiting employment discrimination, protecting pension benefits, and so forth.... [L]abor law without labor, employment
law, is the next wave of the future.").
76

See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.

REV. 1527, 1530 (2002).

Many have lamented the decline of student enrollment as well as course offerings in traditional labor law. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1550 (2005).
78 This is not to suggest that innovation is absent or unwelcome. Several faculty,
for instance, have experimented successfully with simulated workplace organizing
and unfair labor practices litigation in the traditional course. See generally Roberto
Corrada, A Simulation of Union Organizingin a Labor Law Class, 46J. LEGAL EDUc. 445
(1996); C. John Cicero, The Classroom as Shop Floor: Images of Work and the Study of Labor Law, 20 VT. L. REV. 117 (1995).
79 See Willborn, supranote 75, at 549.
80 This move dates roughly to the appearance of the first employment law textbooks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C.
77

HARPER, CASES AND MATERIAL ON THE LAw GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
(1st ed. 1990); MATTHEw A. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE (1st ed. 1989); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT LAw (1st ed. 1987); STEVEN L. WILLBORN ETAL., EMPLOYMENT LAw: CASES
AND MATERIALS

(Ist ed. 1993).
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tional labor law and even employment discrimination, general employment law comprises an amalgam of federal and state statutes and
common-law
principles that differ widely in scope, coverage, and pur81
pose. Thus, the professor teaching basic employment law faces difficult coverage choices (particularly for the course that aspires to include a survey of antidiscrimination law), as well as a significant
pedagogical challenge: the patchwork of laws in play is not easily
shepherded into an integrated thematic structure.82
Recently, faculty in the field have speculated on the value of a
holistic approach to the study of "worklaw"-traditional labor law,
antidiscrimination law, and employment law-that integrates some
portion of the doctrine and of each area with the policy considerations common to all three."' As a curricular choice, such an approach promises to solve the thematic weaknesses of the stand-alone
employment law course model. Placing employment law and labor
law side-by-side allows the course to be structured around the choice
of individual versus collective action and the competing legal regimes

See Estlund, supra note 72, at 798 ("[T] he bulk of employment
law is a bit of a
hodgepodge, as anyone who has taught employment law will concede."); Willborn,
supra note 75, at 549 ("[E]mployment law has no natural organizing principle. There
is no central, federal source of employment law. Instead, employment law is found
in hundreds, if not thousands, of separate statutes and cases.").
82 Dean Steven Willborn, lamenting this problem,
offers a plentiful array of organizing themes in his review of the Rothstein and Liebman text. See Willborn, supra
note 75, at 551-53. However, he also notes significant drawbacks for each proposal.
Id.
83 See, e.g., Richard M. Fischl, Rethinking
the Tripartite Division of American Work
Law, 28 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 169-70 (2007); Lobel, supra note 77, at 154953. The coverage choices of some recent casebooks reflect this view. For example,
one text notes:
This casebook's point of departure comes from . . . the view that the
study of federal labor legislation . . . must not be separated from the
study of ... state and federal law that regulates individual employment
relations. Instead of studying labor and employment law as separate
regimes ... we will examine how the legal discourses of collective bargaining and employment law relate, or should relate, to give rise to
what we shall call 'Work Law.'
KENNETH M. CASEBEER & GARY MINDA, WORK LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3-4 (2005).
Another casebook states:
Understanding the story behind the decline of labor unions and labor
law provides critical assistance in evaluating new employee representation systems and conceptualizing rights ....
A comprehensive study of
the law of work also provides an opportunity to assess critically what
form enforcement of rights should take ....
Accordingly, we have denominated this text WorkLaw and endeavor here to present basic materials on each system of labor market regulation.
MARION CRAIN ET AL., WORKLAW: CASES AND MATERIA xiii-xiv (2005).
81
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that attach to that decision.8 4 It also allows students to experience the
must inevitaprocess of thinking
S 85 across doctrinal boundaries as they
bly do in practice.
But what may be gained thematically is likely to be offset logistically. It is difficult if not impossible to see how an instructor can
meaningfully cover labor, antidiscrimination, and general employment law in a single course.86 If such courses do take root, it seems
likely that they will serve merely as overviews-courses for students
87
advanced study.
seeking a taste of the field-or as gateways to more
If so, the question remains: what is the significance of the stand alone
employment law course, and what value does it add to the law school
curriculum?
The Power ofPrivate Orderingin the Modern
Employment Relationship

B.

This Article offers the theme of relationship planning as a coordinating approach to the stand alone employment law course. At the
end of this Part, I will detail the extensive ways in which both employee- and management-side employment law practice call for the
application of transactional skills and thinking. Before turning to
those examples, however, it is necessary to lay the basis for this development.
In recent decades, there has been increased attention to private
ordering in the identification and realization of employee rights and
employer obligations. 88 Judicial decisions at the state and federal lev-

84

85
86

See Lobel, supranote 77, at 1552-53.
See Fischl, supranote 83, at 168.
Willborn, supra note 75, at 549 (noting that "[s] tructuring employment law as

the core labor law offering[, [including elements of employment discrimination
and collective labor law,] risks even more superficial coverage of the three major topics"). It should be noted that recent "worklaw" texts, while offering a more holistic
view of the law, do not necessarily purport to provide complete coverage of all three
major areas of concentration. See, e.g., CRAIN, supra note 83, at xiv-xv ("This book
will be most useful in Employment Law courses that address [individual rights]. We
advert to Labor Law principles ... throughout the book, but at a policy level rather
than a doctrinal level ... and make no effort here to provide a satisfactory substitute
for a Labor Law text.").
87 This is precisely what has happened with the commercial law curriculum
at
some schools that now offer a general Uniform Commercial Code course purporting
to cover sales, payment systems, and secured transactions.
88 See Roberto L. Corrada, ClaimingPrivateLaw For The Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact And Legacy, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1051, 1055 (1996) (finding "evidence of a New
Private Law shift in the employment and labor law arena" based on Supreme Court
decisions on pre-employment arbitration agreements and union access to private
property); Estlund, supra note 18, at 322 (describing the move toward "self-
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el appear willing to credit employer policies and practices and defer
to their contract documents in limiting liability and defining employee rights. At the same time, employment law scholarship is growing increasingly sensitive to the role employers' internal practices
play in the realization of the goals of workplace law.8 9 Both trends reflect the critical importance of private choices, made principally by
employers, in planning and structuring work relationships and personnel practices.
This Part will consider these interrelated developments. It begins by examining the shift to private law in modern employment law
jurisprudence. It then details the emergence of an increasingly "legalist" approach to human resources management °° and the corresponding rise of a "new institutionalist" movement in employment
law scholarship."1
1. Judicial Deference and the Emerging Private Law
Jurisprudence
Work law in its primordial form of labor law was a shared space
for public and private impulses-a system premised on minimal public intervention with the aim of facilitating private agreement on fair
terms.92 In the latter half of the twentieth century, the field took a
turn toward the public law model with the development of a variety of
common-law causes of action designed to preserve job security9 3 as
regulation" that brings "the locus of enforcement of both fights and regulations inside the firm or under the firm's control"); Lobel, supra note 18, at 344 (2004) (describing the "shift from a regulatory to a governance model" that "challeng[es] the
traditional focus on formal regulation as the dominant locus of change").
89
See generally Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra
note 15; Arnow-Richman,
supra note 18; Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerializationof
Law, 106 AM.J. SOCIOLOGY. 1589 (2001); Edelman, supra note 18; Estlund, supra note
18; Schultz, supra note 16; Sturm, supra note 18; Travis, supra note 17; infra Part
III.B.2.
90 Fischl, supra note
83, at 204.
91 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 77, 120
(2003) (describing "new institutionalism" as the argument that "'the legal environment affects organizational policies and practices' and that the law's 'practical meaning is, to a large degree, determined within organizational fields rather than by official law-makers."').
92 See generally Kare,
supra note 50.
95 See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
925-26 (Ct. App. 1981)
(recognizing viability of contractual claim to job security based on company practices, personal assurances, and industry practices); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register,
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing claim for breach of duty of
good faith based on termination for purposes of avoiding payment of earned commissions); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985)
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well as extensive legislative activity aimed at eliminating status discrimination.9 4 In the last few decades, however, the pendulum has
swung the other way. In assessing both common law and statutory
rights, courts have demonstrated increased deference to private ordering-assigning legal significance to employer polices and practices, as well as their formal written agreements-often to the detriment of workers.
On the state level, this trend can be seen in the emerging common-law jurisprudence of job security claims. A key judicial innovation of the 1980s was the recognition of a cause of action for an employer's breach of an implied-in-fact 'just cause" contract based on a
combination of employer policies, practices and assurances. 95 In re-

cent years, however, courts are visibly reining in these claims, most
notably by awarding summary judgment to employers based on employer-drafted language disclaiming any promise to job security. The
legal significance of disclaimers was acknowledged in tandem with
the recognition of job security claims based on employee handbooks.96 But while many early decisions closely scrutinized such language for consistency with other terms and practices, 97 increasingly
courts seem willing to rubberstamp disclaimer language without regard to contrary evidence, such as oral representations and other
management actions that might reasonably instill expectations of
continued employment on the part of workers. 98 Such disclaimers
(recognizing viability of contractual claim to job security based on personnel manuals); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (Or. 1975) (recognizing tort claim based on
termination for a "socially undesirable motive" in case of worker terminated for jury
service). See also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002) (describing the common-law trend recognizing wrongful discharge claims); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful
Discharge Protectionsin an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1655 (1995) (same).
94 See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-13 (2006)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)). See generally
Estlund, supra note 18, at 331-32 (describing this trend).
95
See, e.g., Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-27; Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267.
96 See Woolley, 491 A.2d
at 1271.
97 See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 351-67 (1992) (describing judicial approaches to effectiveness of disclaimers).
98 See, e.g.,
Grossman v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305-06
(D. Conn. 2000); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Cal. 2000);
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Mich. 1991); Finch v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co. of Sheridan, 109 P.3d 537, 541-42 (Wyo. 2005). See generallyJonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract 43 (Univ. of
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appear with increasing frequency not only in employee handbooks
but also in offer letters, job applications, expense reimbursement
forms, and a host of other employer-drafted personnel documents.'
This type of deference to private action is not limited to common-law claims grounded in contract. A related trend can be discerned in the area of employment law most explicitly associated with
the public law/civil rights model: antidiscrimination law. In the last
two decades, the Supreme Court of the United States, through its decisions on both arbitration agreements and sexual harassment claims,
has signaled a turn in favor of private dispute resolution and private
ordering generally. In Gilmer v. Interstate and Circuit City v. Adams, the
Court held that employment contracts are subject to the Federal Arbitration Act and that an employee's agreement to arbitrate does not
constitute a waiver of federal statutory rights.'00 These decisions allow
employers to insist on ex ante agreements to submit any employment
claims, including those arising under federal discrimination statutes,
to private resolution. 1 During the same period, the Court decided
Ellerth v. Burlington and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, which established an affirmative defense to vicarious liability in sexual harass-

Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015136 (describing this judicial trend in favor of employers as the inevitable result of reliance on contract law, which allows the party with
stronger bargaining power to draft away the possibility of implied protections). Empirical research demonstrates that most workers incorrectly believe they are protected against arbitrary dismissal even when presented with an employer's reservation
of rights to terminate without cause in a personnel manual. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim,
Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REv. 447, 447 (1999); see also Cynthia Estlund, How Wrong are Employees About
Their Rights, and Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y. U. L. REv. 6, 9-11 (2002) (summarizing
and discussing Professor Kim's data).
99 See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc, 779 F.2d 101,
104 (2d Cir. 1985)
(disclaimer appearing in a reimbursement form); Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.,
139 P.3d 56, 58 (Cal. 2006) (disclaimer appearing in an offer letter); Nieves v. Bell
Indus., 204 Mich. App. 459, 461-62 (Ct. App. 1994) (job application and compensation agreement containing a disclaimer); Barnell v. Taubman Co., 203 Mich. App.
110, 113 (Ct. App. 1993) ("memorandum" distributed to workforce as a disclaimer).
100 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding
employment contracts to be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006), and not
excluded under exception for railroad workers, seamen, and other workers engaged
in commerce); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006), compelled enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreement between stock broker and New York
Stock Exchange).
101 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (distinguishing prior decision in Alexander
v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and holding that a collective bargaining agreement
could not preclude plaintiff from bringing statutory discrimination claims in federal
court).
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ment claims based largely on employer policies and practices. 0 2 Under these cases, the employer can successfully avoid liability if it shows
that it implemented measures to prevent and respond to harassment,
which the plaintiff unreasonably failed to utilize. 0 3 District and appellate courts applying the Ellerth/Faragher doctrine have since
treated employers' sexual harassment policies as a (if not the) critical
factual element in determining whether a worker's claim will survive
summary judgment. 01 4 Considering the arbitration and harassment
decisions together, employers are in a position to reduce the likelihood that claims will arise through preventive measures, to limit the
likelihood of liability by responding appropriately, and to ensure that
in the event a claim arises it we be resolved in a pre-designated forum
of their own choosing.
2.

Employers as Legal Actors and the Rise of New
Institutionalism

Employers are savvy to the power of planning. No stranger to
and obligations associated with employment, they have long
risks
the
relied on individually negotiated written instruments when hiring
upper echelon employees to limit the likelihood of loss or liability. 105
Executive contracts generally structure the flow of compensation and
establish termination protocols that both incentivize desirable worker
behavior and protect the company in the event the relationship
sours.

106

What is changing is employers' expanded focus on rank-and-file
personnel issues as a critical front in the battle to minimize legal

102

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
103 Specifically, the employer will avoid liability where it can prove: (1) that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior"; and (2) that the "employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer," or otherwise
avoid harm. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
104 See David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An EmpiricalExamination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283 (2001) (finding
existence of a sexual harassment policy containing the requisite judicially articulated
provisions to be the only factor statistically predicting an award of summary judgment in employer's favor).
105 See Stewart Schwab & Randall Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For? 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 246-57
(2006) (describing content of such agreements).
106
See id. at 246-54.
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risk. 0 7 Human resources departments and in-house counsel offices
have proliferated and, with them, businesses' reliance on contractual
documents and formal policies imposed across the workforce.' 0
Companies now frequently require workers at all levels to sign a host
of standard forms, including such things as agreements to arbitrate,
waivers of employment status, acknowledgements of at-will status,
noncompetition agreements and other restrictive covenants."0 Similarly, it has become standard practice for large companies to maintain anti-harassment and discrimination policies, internal dispute
resolution mechanisms, and other best practices and procedures for
handling worker complaints and requests. 110
Scholars of employment law are taking note as well. Borrowing
from the teachings of social science and organizational theory, a body
of "new institutionalist" scholarship has claimed the practices and
policies of employers as key components in the social understanding,
effectiveness, and, ultimately, the content of workplace regulation."'
Professor Laura Edelman's managerialization-of-law theory teaches
that the way in which employers respond to and implement legal
mandates often reflects managerial values distinct from (and at times
counter to) the goals of the laws themselves." 2 Thus, employers have
implemented internal dispute resolution programs that tend to focus
107

See Adele Nicholas, GCs Reveal Their LitigationFears and Headaches, CORP. LEGAL

TIMES, Oct. 2004, at 72 (indicating that 62 percent of surveyed general counsel

ranked labor and employment litigation as their number one potential exposure).
Further evidence of the increased concern about personnel matters as a serious
business issue is a recent trend toward seeking business executives to serve in key
human resources positions. See Erin White, HR Departments Get New Star Power at Some
Firms: Business Executives Now Tapped to Lead as Job is Rethought, WALL ST. J., June 23,
2008, at B6.
108 See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 17, at 953-57; Estlund,
supra note 18, at
335-38; Sturm, supra note 18, at 527-30.
19 See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (workers required to sign document providing that worker was "an Independent Contractor" and nothing in the agreement should be construed as creating an
"employer-employee relationship"). On the prevalence of and relationship between
noncompete and arbitration agreements, see generally Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 15; Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supranote 15; and Cynthia
Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants
as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379 (2006).
110 See generally Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration
at
Gilmer's Quinceafiera,81 TUL. L. REv. 331 (2006) (describing arbitration agreements);
Shultz, supra note 16, 2103-19 (describing sexual harassment policies).
I See, e.g., Williams & Segal, supra note 91, at 120 (describing "new institutionalism" as the argument that "'the legal environment affects organizational policies and
practices' and that the law's 'practical meaning is, to a large degree, determined
within organizational fields rather than by official law-makers'").
112 See generally Edelman et al., supra note 89.
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on conflict management more than the legal rights of aggrieved
workers." 3 Similarly, their antidiscrimination and harassment policies have frequently targeted consensual workplace relationships and
non-harassing sexual behavior consistent with management's interest
in maintaining a strict and productive work environment as well as its
desire1 14 to avoid liability associated with unwelcome sexual harassment.

This process has both risks and advantages to would-be plaintiffs.
In the area of harassment, where employer policies have become an
explicit component of the vicarious liability rule, scholars have expressed concern that a system of "paper compliance" will overtake
genuine efforts to eradicate workplace harassment.15 A stream of
federal court decisions finding in favor of employers on the basis of
paper polices gives credence to these fears." 6 Yet employer efforts at
liability avoidance in other contexts, most notably under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), appear to point in the other direction. Business compliance literature and existing empirical research
suggest that employers may be over-complying with the lawaccommodating workers that, until recently," 7 would not have met
11

Lauren B. Edelman et al., InternalDispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil

Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW Soc'Y REv 497, 511-12 (1993) (suggesting that employers may use internal discrimination complaint resolution mechanisms more for
purposes of advancing a managerial goal of ensuring smooth employee relations
than for vindicating legal rights); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic
Structures: OrganizationalMediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AMJ. SOCIOLOGY 1531, 154547 (1992).
114 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 16, at 2090-94 (explaining how the
proscription
against workplace sexual harassment has been interpreted by employers as consistent
with an ideal of a sanitized workplace focused on productivity and divorced from passion and emotion).
11
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2006); Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Coming to Terms
with Zero Tolerance Sexual Harassment Policies, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAc. 65, 97
(2004) (warning of the likelihood of mere symbolic compliance by employers).
16
See Bagenstos, supra note 115, at 25-26 ("Under the prevailing approach, employers can avoid liability for harassment simply by adopting and distributing policies .... This is true even absent any indication that the process set up by the employer has been effective at that or any other workplace."); Sherwyn et al., supra note
104, at 1283-85 (finding the existence of a sexual harassment policy containing the
requisite judicially articulated provisions to be the only factor to statistically predict
an award of summary judgment in an employer's favor).
117 Under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became effective January 1,
2009, Congress expanded the definition of "disability" to include a variety of impairments that might not previously have been protected under the Act, such as episodic impairments, impairments alleviated by mitigating measures, impairments affecting only the ability to perform one's job, and impairments to bodily systems that
do not necessarily manifest in one's performance of life activities. See 42 U.S.C. §
12102; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
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the legal definition of disability and providing accommodations beyond what the law
considers reasonable and necessary-in an effort
8
to avoid liability."1

This Article is not the place to debate the role that employer
compliance efforts should play in judicial assessment of liability or
the merits of the private turn in employment law generally. I have
discussed these questions in other contexts, as have many others." 9
Rather, the point is that the choices employers (and to a lesser extent
employees 20 ) make at the outset of and during the course of their relationship have significant legal ramifications. The reach and scope
of workplace policies and the nature of employer responses to employee requests and workplace disputes often determine whether a
claim will arise, where it will be resolved, and, ultimately, whether liability will result.
C.

The Employment Lawyer as TransactionPlannerand Business
Decision Maker

The previously described common-law and statutory developments both reflect and require a change in the nature of employment practice. Given the prominent role of federal discrimination
claims in employment law, practitioners in the field have often been
thought of principally as litigators. From this perspective, employeeside lawyers serve as public advocates, vindicating workers' rights
though the administrative and court systems, while management lawyers act principally in a responsive role, defending managerial interAssessing The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 2-8, on file with author) (summarizing the 2008 changes to the
ADA's definition of "disability").
118 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter:
Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 305, 333, 335, 338 (2008); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of Current Employees, 75 MIss. LJ. 917, 939, 941-42 (2006); Travis, supra
note 17, at 44-55.
119

For a critical perspective on the role of employer policies and practices on

worker rights, see generally Bagenstos, supra note 115; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning
Formfrom Substance: UnderstandingEmployer LitigationPrevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POLY'J. 1 (1999); and Schultz, supra note 16. For expressions of cautious opti-

mism about the value of internal employer compliance efforts, see generally ArnowRichman, supra note 18 (benefits to working caregivers); Stephen F. Befort, Accom-

modation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Possibilitiesfor Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'y 615 (2004) (benefits to disabled workers); and Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial
Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005) (workplace
safety compliance).

For a roadmap to enhancing the oversight and effectiveness of

self-regulatory efforts by employers, see Estlund, supra note 18, at 377-83.
120 1 take up the role of transactional planning in representing workers infra
Part
III.C.2.
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ests and seeking to limit employment rights through favorable judicial ruling.
The pedagogy of employment law courses generally caters to this
civil rights model of employment practice, and not without some legitimacy. Employment discrimination cases have continued their
upward spiral since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and com2
1
prise approximately ten percent of the federal bench's case docket.
Law firms also embed this model in their firm structure. Employment practice groups often developed and continue to be situated
under the umbrella of their firm's litigation department.
Yet the developments previously described require employment
lawyers to assume a stronger preventive role, particularly (though not
exclusively) those who advise management on employment issues.
The frontline in employment practice is no longer the dispositive
motion stage, nor even the pre-litigation phase, of a dispute. It is a
point in time well in advance of any dispute, often in advance of hire,
when the lawyer structures the intended work relationship, or influences that structure, in a way that best meets the client's needs. For
this reason, it would be a mistake to continue viewing the practice of
employment law as a litigator's domain. Transactional training-the
analytical approach and practical skills employed in planning and
counseling clients-must be a significant component of any employment law course. To that end, this Part describes how and where
transactional teaching moments arise in employment law and practice, as well as what their inclusion means in terms of the ideology of
the classroom.
1. Identifying Drafting and.Planning Opportunities
From the employer's perspective, there are two main areas of
employment practice that offer synergies with the goals of the transactional curriculum: drafting contracts between the company and its
workers and developing policies on behalf of management. Management lawyers routinely draft a host of contract documents, including pre-dispute arbitration agreements, severance and release agreements, independent contractor agreements, and noncompetes and
other restrictive covenants. They are frequently involved in the development or revision of written policies on such matters as parental
leave, disability, nondiscrimination and harassment, internal and external dispute resolution, and discipline and termination procedures.

121

See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-DiscriminationPlaintiffs Fare in the

FederalCourts Of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 547, 548 (2003).
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The following scenarios illustrate how such matters arise in practice:
1. A software company is considering developing a database
product in the competitive market of medical office
technology. Its workers are highly skilled and highly mobile. The client would like to know what measures it can
put into place to safeguard product secrecy and reduce
the risk that its key employees will defect to competitors
prior to the completion of the project. At the same time,
2
it wants to ensure that it remains competitive in hiring.1 1
2.

A foreign-based company is in the process of opening a
U.S. office. It has a written parental leave policy used in
its foreign offices that provides twelve weeks of paid leave
to mothers of newborn children and six weeks paid leave
plus six weeks unpaid leave to fathers of newborn children. The client would like to know whether it must
alter
23
any aspect of this policy to comply with U.S. law. 1

3.

A company has just emerged from a protracted employment discrimination lawsuit. While it ultimately won at
trial, its litigation costs were significant. The company's
human resources director has heard about the cost-saving
benefits of arbitration and is considering adopting a
company-wide policy requiring employees to agree to
submit all disputes to arbitration. The client would like
to know whether such a policy would be in its best interest and, if so, what the terms of its arbitration policy
ought to be. 124

As these examples suggest, transactional questions are not specific to any one area of employment law doctrine. They will surely
arise with respect to matters that are fundamentally contractual. In
the first scenario, for instance, the resources on which the lawyer will
most likely draw will be restrictive covenants, fixed term contracts, or
some combination of these legal tools. But transactional problems
can also arise with respect to public law mandates, such as federal antidiscrimination law and minimum labor standards. As the second
and third scenarios illustrate, these are areas in which corporate clients are likely to have questions regarding compliance and planning,
1

See Comprehensive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 733-

34 (4th Cir. 1993).
123 See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNow-RCHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAw: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 686 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,

2007) (problem 10.3).
124 Id. at928 (problem 13.7).
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and, in the last example, may use contract (in the form of an arbitration agreement) to implement their choices.
When examining these examples, it also becomes apparent why
transactional questions require more than just the ability to understand legal rules and draft legal instruments. Consistent with the
teachings of preventive law theory, these scenarios require the lawyer
to consider the client's business interests in determining its best legal
course of action. In the first and third scenarios, the client is explicit
about those interests. Even if noncompetition law would enable the
employer in the first scenario to require a broad restraint against
post-employment competition, the employer will want to temper its
contract somewhat to ensure that it does not lose strong job candidates with multiple employment opportunities who are put off by
such terms. 2 5 In the third scenario, the client wants the attorney not
simply to produce a viable arbitration agreement, but to opine on
whether it would be worthwhile to implement an arbitration policy at
all.
In some situations, however, the client's goals are less clear and
may implicate ethical questions about the lawyer's role. The employer in the second scenario merely asks whether its paid leave policy must be altered to comply with U.S. law. In fact, the United States
does not require the employer to provide any paid leave at all, although it does require that any voluntarily provided benefit program
treat men and women equally absent a medical reason for the deviation. 126 The attorney in this situation will have to explain this to the
client and determine whether the employer wants to provide paid

On the influence of relational incentives on employers' choice to require a
noncompete agreement, see Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 15, at
662 n.115.
126 The federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires employers of fifty employees or more to provide qualifying employees of either gender with a maximum
of twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for a discrete set of qualifying caregiving-related events. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(a). This
leaves the employer free to provide additional benefits on a voluntary basis, such as
paid leave, provided it does not run afoul of basic gender-discrimination prohibitions, which would make unlawful any policy that benefits women more than men.
The exception is a situation in which the employer provides additional benefits to
women on the basis of pregnancy or related medical conditions. This is because the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006), requires genderneutral treatment only insofar as a pregnant woman is similarly situated to male
comparators in her ability to perform the requirements of the job. See generally Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 328-29 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining the distinction
between parental leave benefits that must be gender neutral and lawful disability
leave favoring biological mothers under PDA).
125
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leave absent a legal obligation to do so before adjusting the policy to
comply with antidiscrimination law.
These types of transactional planning questions need not arise
exclusively in management-oriented practices. High level workers,
and workers at any level who have sought-after skill sets, may be in a
position to request particular terms of employment or to negotiate
out of an employer's standard requirements. Workers in weaker bargaining positions, who have little to no ability to demand unique
terms of employment, can expect to be confronted with their employer's form agreements and other unilaterally drafted documents
on which they may need the advice of counsel. Finally, incumbent
employees at all levels may encounter personal circumstances-the
need for leave, a medical accommodation, or similar event-that will
lead them to a lawyer to learn more about their legal rights.
The following scenarios are typical of transactional problems
that an employee-side lawyer might encounter:
4. A recent veterinary school graduate has been offered a
position with an established veterinarian in a small town.
The established doctor has asked her to sign a contract
that prohibits her from practicing animal medicine
within the county limits for two years after terminating
her relationship with the practice. She would like to
know whether such an agreement is enforceable, and if
so, whether she can refuse to sign it. 121
5.

A truck driver was recently injured in an automobile accident in which he sustained serious back injuries that
will permanently limit his ability to lift and carry. He has
been on medical leave for some time and is now free to
return to work as a driver, but he will not be able to do
the loading and unloading work that his employer typically requires. He wants to know what his rights are.
As with the management-side examples, these scenarios demand
more than just an assessment of the law. Irrespective of the enforceability of the noncompete presented in the fourth scenario, the client
is best off avoiding the hassle of having to litigate that question when
and if she leaves the established veterinarian's practice. It is therefore in her interest to avoid signing the noncompete now.'2 9 WeighSee Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 536-37 (Wyo. 1993).
Cf GLYNN, ARNow-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123, at 646 (problem
10.1).
12
See generally Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note
15, at 980-84 (describing the in terrorem effects and practical difficulties that noncompetes create for departing employees irrespective of whether the restraint proves enforceable in court).
127
28
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ing against her refusal are the relational risks of raising objections to
the employer's form. In the fifth scenario, the employee's legal
rights are questionable. Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,30
as a disability;1
his back injury most likely would not have qualified
and even subsequent to that Act, accommodating his condition may
3
to the employer. '
be unreasonable or pose an undue hardship
However, those legal issues may not matter. He is free to request an
accommodation, and if it is framed effectively-with reference to the
law, but with sensitivity to the employer's needs-it may well be
granted. 132

In sum, transactional questions are pervasive in all types of employment practice. The management attorney can expect to review
policies, draft contracts, and consult about particular personnel decisions and general human resources strategies, while the employeeside attorney should anticipate being called upon to evaluate the risks
and benefits associated with employer-drafted documents and help
workers assert rights and preferences in the face of employer policies
and practices. In all cases, this will require skills well beyond cognitive knowledge of legal rules and the ability to apply them to the facts
of a particular dispute. It will require the lawyer to appreciate a
range of human and business interests, to identify relational and legal
risks, and to forge and execute an appropriate course of action-in
33
short, the full complement of preventive law skills.1 It is time to
make that skill set a priority in preparing students to practice employment law.

See, e.g., Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
work-related back injury that hindered the employee's ability to perform her job was
not a disability under the 1990 Act because there was no evidence that the injury affected the employee's major life activities); Sarmento v. Henry Schein, Inc., 262 Fed.
App'x. 26, 27 (9th Cir. 2007) (lifting restrictions resulting from a back injury did not
constitute a disability under the 1990 Act because an inability to perform a particular
job is not a substantial limitation). For an explaination of the changes wrought by
the 2008 Act, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2002) (employee's request to have someone else perform the heaviest lifting was unreasonable
because some heavy lifting was an essential function of the city job of operator of
construction equipment); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260 (lth
Cir. 2001) (employer was not required to alter the position of material handler for
an employee with a back injury because lifting items weighing up to fifty pounds was
an essential function of the job).
132 For a discussion of the reasons why employers may be inclined to grant accommodations not mandated by law, see Hoffman, supra note 118, at 335-37; Schartz
et al., supranote 118, at 941-43; Travis, supra note 17, at 44-55; supraPart III.B.2.
133 See supra Part
II.C.
13
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2.

Resisting Claims of Right and Left
The next Part of this Article tackles the specifics of how to incorporate transactional training into the basic employment law
course. Before turning to implementation, however, it is important
to address the ideological significance of adding a transactional component to the course. Many of the jurisprudential developments described in the previous Part are decidedly anti-plaintiff in effect, if not
in intent. Even so, teaching transactionally should not be equated
with presenting a management-sided course or even a purely transactional one.
To begin, the pedagogical approach espoused here is intended
to supplement rather than displace other teaching methods and
course themes. Advocacy skills remain important for all members of
the employment bar, including those representing corporate clients.
While corporate and commercial law practices tend to sharply divide
the "litigators" from the "deal makers," management-side employment lawyers both make their beds and lie in them. That is, these
lawyers both draft contracts and policies and litigate their effect and
enforceability down the road. Pedagogical reform that comes at the
expense of traditional training would be a disservice to aspiring management lawyers, as well as to the future members of the plaintiffs
bar.
Neither must transactional training necessarily focus on management-side work. As the previous Part indicates, opportunities to
apply transactional skills and thinking will present in employee-side
practice as well, albeit with less frequency.14 Such skills are also applicable in other dynamics that attorneys for employees will regularly
encounter. Negotiation and settlement of disputes, while heavily dependent on advocacy skills, also require the creative problem solving
ability that transactional training cultivates. 135 The lawyer who understands how to avoid problems ex ante will likely do better at resolving
them post hoc. 136 Finally would-be plaintiff's attorneys will benefit
from better understanding the perspective of the opposing party.
The goal of transactional teaching is to present lawyering in an active
posture that more closely approximates real-life practice. Employeeside lawyers will fare better if they understand the business and rela-

See supraPart III.C.1.
See Re, supra note 61, at 694-97 (describing relationship between
preventive
law practice and the skills required for conciliation and settlement).
3

35

136

See id.
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tional motivations that underlie employers' policies, practices, and
legal strategies.
More importantly, management-side transactional practice need
not be taught from the perspective of liability avoidance. Reducing
the costs associated with employment is certainly a motive and effect
of proactive defense practice; but compliance is an equally important
goal. To the extent management lawyers emphasize compliance in
their practice, their transactional planning activities need not be at
odds with plaintiffs' interests. If an employer, through advice of
counsel, familiarizes itself with the law and acts in accordance with its
legal obligations, the employee is better off than if the employer
shirks responsibility, forcing that individual to pursue her rights
through judicial or other legal channels. 1 37 Of course, the approach
is also less costly to the employer. In short, where compliance (rather
than avoidance) is the primary defense strategy, everyone is advantaged.
There is even reason to believe that in some cases transactional
defense practice will result in outcomes better than what workers
would obtain through the adversarial process. As previously noted,
research on ADA accommodation requests suggests that employers
not infrequently grant accommodations to workers who do not qualData suggest that they both accommoify for statutory protection.
date workers who do not meet what, until recently, was a strict statutory definition of disability, and they provide accommodations that at
times exceed what the law requires of them. 139 Preventive law theory
offers insight on this phenomenon. Given the complexity of clients'
interests and human motivation, it is seldom advisable or possible to
eliminate risk completely or pursue a strategy that reaches to the limits of the law. 4° Thus, in the fifth scenario, involving the injured
There is extensive literature on the superiority of non-litigation channels for
achieving better outcomes for disputants, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
It should be noted, however, that scholars of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
have long emphasized the potential for "win-win" outcomes through cooperative,
problem solving approaches to party disputes that aim to identify shared interests.
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers, 10
WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 37, 42-43 (2002) (noting that ADR outcomes are "qualitatively
better" when parties take a cooperative approach rather than an adversarial approach to resolving legal disputes); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Business Lawyering and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1995) (describing ways in which lawyers, through negotiation, structure solutions that maximize value and benefit all parties).
138 See supraPart
III.B.2.
139 See Hoffman, supra note 118, at 333, 338; supraPart III.B.2.
140 See DAUER, supra note
65, at 19.
137
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truck driver, a compliance-oriented management lawyer might agree
to an accommodation irrespective of whether the driver has a statutory disability, either through an abundance of caution or to advance
other managerial interests (such as the desire to maintain a good
worker or avoid a gap in coverage).4' In short, transactional training

is not about teaching students how to skirt legal obligations or avoid
liability. Rather it is an opportunity to inculcate those who will be
representing management with a compliance ethic. By incorporating
a transactional perspective in the classroom we can prepare students
not simply to do right by their client but to run a management-side
practice responsibly.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH: THE LAW OF
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS AS AN EXERCISE IN TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE

The previous Part explained why the employment law course is a
valuable platform for training transactionally minded lawyers as well
as why the contemporary employment practitioner must acquire
transactional skills. This Part turns to the mechanics of leveraging
those synergies in the classroom.
Transactional teaching can be achieved through a variety of
techniques and using any number of materials. In its simplest form,
it consists of supplementing doctrinal discussion rooted in case law
and rule application with forward-thinking questions that push students to implement law proactively. The book that I use in the basic
three-credit employment law course, Employment Law: Private Ordering
and Its Limitations, by Timothy Glynn, Charles Sullivan, and me, provides the advantage of incorporating these types of questions and
problems in the text itself among the primary materials and authors'
notes.142 Of course, once an instructor becomes accustomed to identifying transactional teaching moments, it is easy to supplement any
set of materials with these types of questions and problems.
Ideally, however, transactional teaching should go beyond classroom discussion. Providing a rich forum for developing skills in this
area often requires an extended experience in which students can
put their ideas and advice to the test in a realistic context. This Part
describes an exercise I have developed and incorporated into the basic three-credit employment law course that requires students to revise an employer's personnel manual in light of case law suggesting

141

See Travis, supra note 17, at 44-55 (describing advantages to employer of strong

accommodation ethic).

142 GLYNN, ARNow-RIcmI

N & SuLLWAN, supranote 123.
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that such documents can have contractual significance. The assignment is administered upon completion of the doctrinal materials on
employee handbooks, thus providing a simulated practice experience
in which students engage in problem-solving, drafting, and anticipating client needs in response to existing law.
This Part begins with a brief primer on the state of the law on
employee handbooks, drawing on the three principal cases that students in my course read prior to participating in the revision exercise.
It then describes the goals and parameters of the exercise and provides instruction on how to administer it. Finally, this Part deconstructs the exercise, offering insights on its pedagogical value.
A.

Handbook Basics

Employee handbook law offers an accessible and highly realistic
context for constructing an exercise in transactional practice. It is
well-settled in almost all jurisdictions that promises contained in an
43
employer-drafted personnel manual can be contractually binding.
The key case, presented in most employment law casebooks as well as
many contracts casebooks, is the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Woolley v. Hoffmann La Roche. ' This case serves as the principal source for teaching the basic doctrine in my textbook, as well as
the factual scenario on which the handbook revision exercise is
based.
In Woolley, an engineer with nearly nine years on the job was
fired after writing a report on a piping problem in his employer's
building.' 45 Upon hire, the plaintiff had received a company personnel manual that stated, "It is the policy of Hoffmann-La Roche to retain to the extent consistent with company requirements, the services
of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and effectively."14 6 The manual also listed and defined six types of termination:
"'layoff,' 'discharge due to performance,' 'discharge, disciplinary,'
'retirement' and 'resignation." '"4 7 It made no mention of the possi48
bility of termination without cause.1

143 An important exception
occurs under Montana law, where such claims are
preempted by the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (2007).
144 Woolley v. Hoffmann La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985).
145 Id. at
1258.
146 Id. at 1259
n.2.
147 Id.

W4 Id.
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Woolley sued for breach of contract, alleging the company had
violated the termination policy in the manual by firing him without
cause." 9 The court agreed that the contents of the manual, including
the categories and procedures for termination, could contractually
bind the employer. 5 0 Emphasizing the language of the manual and
the context in which it was disseminated, the court stated that the
document comprised the most definitive statement of the company's
policies and that an employee would likely view it as binding.1 5 ' The
court held that under these circumstances the manual should be
"construe [d] . . .in accordance with the reasonable expectations
of
the employees." 152

In so holding, however, the court created a significant loophole.
Addressing anticipated objections by employers, including the fear
that the decision would open the floodgates to employee handbook
claims, the court offered employers a blueprint for avoiding liability.
It stated that employers wishing to preserve the nonbinding status of
its policies are free to do so by inserting disclaiming language in their
personnel materials. The court explained:
All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any
kind by the employer contained in the manual; that regardless of
what the manual says or provides, the employer promises nothing
and remains free to change wages and all other working conditions without having to consult anyone and without anyone's
agreement; and that the employer continues to have the absolute
power to fire anyone with or without good cause.153
This language exposes students to the key contractual tool they
will employ in revising the manual on behalf of Hoffmann-La Roche.
If an employer does not want to be bound by its handbook, the Woolley court explains, it must say so explicitly. Since that decision, a large
body of case law has developed on the viability of disclaimer language
in employee handbooks, much of which gives significant deference to
employers that include such language. However, at least some courts
have shown a willingness to permit employee contract claims where
the employer's disclaimer is confusing or perceived as contradictory
to other parts of the handbook. In Conner v. City of Forest Acres, the
South Carolina Supreme Court denied summary judgment to an em149 Id. at
5

51
152

153

1258.

Wooley, 491 A.2d at 1264.
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1271.
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ployer on an employee's breach of contract claim despite the fact
that the handbook on which it was based contained numerous disclaimers and reiterations of employees' at-will status. 1 4 Conner was a
police dispatcher for the city of Forest Acres from 1984 until her termination in 1993.155 The city's personnel manual, on which Conner
based her breach of contract claim, contained extensive provisions
regarding the bases and mechanism for discharge and discipline. '6
Among other things, the manual contained a nonexclusive list of acts
considered to be violations of the city's code of conduct, all of which
were for-cause bases for discipline or termination.151 It also laid out a
three-step progressive discipline policy. 15'

However, the manual dis-

claimed any obligation to follow this progression and stated in several
151
places that its policies were noncontractual and subject to change.
The court found a jury question on whether the handbook created a contractual right to termination only for cause pursuant to the
procedures outlined therein.1 60 The court explained that the handbook contained numerous statements that were entirely at odds with
its various disclaimers. 16' For instance, the manual used mandatory
language when describing the disciplinary process, asserting that
"discipline shall be of an increasingly progressive nature." 162 Such
language was enough to create a factual question as to whether a rea16
3
sonable employee would understand the manual to be contractual.
Thus, Connerpresents a second point of law that students must assimilate in conducting the revision exercise: not only must the handbook
include an appropriate disclaimer, it must avoid conflicting promissory language.
The final frontier in the law of employee handbook, and the
area in which significant legal uncertainty persists, concerns handbook modification. Assuming the handbook has the force of contract, how do employers go about changing its terms? Jurisdictions
Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 560 S.E.2d 606, 612 (S.C. 2002).
Id. at 607.
156 Id. at 608-09.
157 Id. at
608.
158Id.
159 Id.
1

155

160

Conner, 560 S.E.2d at 611.

161 Id.
162
163

Id. at 611 n.4.
Cf Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985)

(When an employer distributes a manual providing certain employee benefits, a
court "should construe them in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the

employees.").
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that have wrestled with the question are divided. Some hold that the
employer may modify its handbook unilaterally and others require
something akin to a formal contract modification.'" DeMasse v. IT
Corp., a case on certified question to the Arizona Supreme Court, offers students a glimpse of both camps. 65In 1989, well after the plaintiff-employees had been hired, the defendant-employer modified its
personnel manual to include an "at-will" provision and a clause permitting unilateral modification.166 Subsequently, in 1993, the employer announced that future layoffs, previously based on seniority,
would now be dependent on performance. 167 The plaintiffs were laid
off under the new policy and brought breach of contract claims
against the company based on the original handbook. 18 The precise
question certified to the court was whether the employer could unilaterally alter the layoff procedure, assuming the manual was contractual to begin with."16
The majority held that it could not.17 0 Adopting what is arguably
emerging as the minority rule, the court held that once an employer
contracts to provide a form of job security, an implied-in-fact agreement exists which can be modified only with consideration from the
employer and explicit assent by the employee."' The majority rejected the idea that the employee's decision to remain employed or
the employer's decision to retain the employee could supply the requisite contract formalities, insisting on "[s] eparate consideration, beyond continued employment."1 2 It further held that in order for the
employer to secure employee acceptance, the "employee must be informed of any new term, aware of its impact on the pre-existing con-

1
Compare Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000) (holding that
contract
rights which were unilaterally granted may also be unilaterally reduced or terminated), and Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998) (holding
that continuing employment by an employee after a unilateral contract offer constitutes the necessary consideration for an acceptance when the employee had been
notified of the change), with Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662
A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995) (holding that continued work by an employee does not
comprise an acceptance of a modified handbook manual that "substantially interferes with an employee's legitimate expectations about the terms of employment").
16 DeMasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138,
1140 (Ariz. 1999).
16 Id. at 1141.
167 Id.

168
16

170
1

172

Id.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1144.
DeMasse, 984 P.2d at 1144.
Id. at 1145.
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affirmatively consent to it to accept the offered modificatract, 1and
73
tion."

A strong dissent took issue with the notion that the employment
relationship had ever lost its at-will character as a result of the company's layoff policy and argued that continued retention of the workers alone provided sufficient consideration for any new terms. 174 Insisting that employers must retain discretion to alter terms of
employment when economic necessity dictates, it concluded: "A single contract term in a policy manual may, while it exists, become an
enforceable condition of employment ...

[and] the party unilaterally

responsible for inserting it into the manual may, on reasonable notice, exercise an equal right to remove it. ' 75
Goals and Logistics

B.

The basic instructions for the exercise are presented as a problem in the casebook:
Imagine that, following Woolley, the Human Resources director at Hoffmann-LaRoche contacts you about revising
the company's personnel manual. The HR director feels
that the manual is good for employee morale and would
like to continue using it, but hopes to alter the language so
as to protect the company from future contractual liability.
Look at footnote 2 of Woolley, which contains the key language that gave rise to Woolley's claim. How would you redraft this? What might you add?
76 Will the revision you cre1
ate satisfy the company's goals?

I supplement this with an assignment memo that describes the exercise requirements, as well as a digital copy of the handbook text taken
directly from the case. Because the court quotes only a small amount
of the most relevant language, tying the exercise to the case
77 provides
1
assignment.
of
scope
the
on
limit
a natural and necessary
173

Id. at 1146.

174 Id.
175
176

at 1153-55 (Jones,J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1153.
GLYNN, ARNow-RICHMAN &

177 I

SULLivAN, supra note

123, at 115.

am forever dismayed by the fact that the critical language from which the
court derives a contractual promise to job security is contained in lowly footnote to
the opinion. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1259 n.2 (N.J.
1985). However, it offers the opportunity to point out how important it is to read
cases at this level of detail, as well as to demonstrate how little legal rules mean in the
absence of specific facts. See generally David Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of Rashomon for Current Legal Education, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
969, 969-70 (1991) (critiquing the legal academy's emphasis on legal rules and its
failure to teach students how to find and analyze facts).
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I impose strict limits on the resources students can consult. Students may use only the three principal cases in the textbook- Woolley,
Connor, and DeMasse--and the accompanying note material. 178

Out-

side research (legal or otherwise) is prohibited. This is in part to ensure that students do not turn in a ready-made, internet-accessible
form of questionable quality in fulfillment of the assignment.' 79 It is

also to preempt the inevitable wrongheaded plunge into additional
case law. Having completed one or more years of law school courses
taught predominantly in the advocacy tradition, students are primed
to turn to Westlaw or LexisNexis to suss out the "key case" that will
magically answer whatever legal question they face. That is generally
not the way to approach a transactional problem. Indeed the notion
of a case "on point" is inapposite here; students have yet to draft the
language that would form the factual basis for an analogy to decisional law.'80 Contrary to prior skills experiences, the "answer" here
will not come from more cases but from thinking creatively and strategically about what they already know.
The goal of the revision is explicit. Both the casebook instructions and the supplemental assignment memo emphasize that students are to revise the manual in light of the client's competing interests."" These include avoiding future liability and maintaining the
utility of the manual as a management tool. The former interest
flows directly from the case law: the employer wants to prevent a repeat of the result in Woolley. It would like the freedom to alter or deviate from the provisions in its handbook without placing itself at risk
of a breach of contract suit. The latter interest has nothing to do
with the case law and is in fact at odds with the employer's desire to
reduce legal risk. The content of the handbook, particularly those
178 See

GLYNN, ARNow-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123 at 102-22.
is a wide literature on the value and efficiency of form contracts,
which
is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Symposium, "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006). It is worth noting, however,
that recent scholarship has called into question the effectiveness of standard contracts used even in heavily negotiated and highly lawyered contexts. See, e.g.,
Steven
M. Davidoff, The Structure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 42-43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=I148178 (describing
how relational and institutional impediments to modifying the structure of private
equity acquisitions resulted in the collapse of multiple transactions amid the economic downturn of 2007).
180 It is for this reason that this
Article refers to the skill of transactional lawyering
as "creating facts from law." See infra Part IV.C.l; cf Brest, supra note 39, at 7
("[L]awyers in everyday practice are called upon to help clients arrange their future
affairs in dynamically changing situations where the facts, as well as the law, are anything but determinate.")
GLVNN, ARNoW-RIcHMAN & SuLLIvAN, supra note 123, at 115.
179 There
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provisions that relate to job security, help create a positive work environment. The court in Woolley describes the company's handbook as
an "attractive inducement" to employees that has helped it to achieve
a reputation as an employer of choice. 182 The literature of business
management has linked workplace morale to business outcomes, and
thus the positive impressions the manual creates may translate into a
productivity advantages for the employer.' 83 A widely disseminated
manual can also ensure some amount of consistency in the adminiIn this way it serves top managestration of personnel matters.
ment's interests in maintaining a degree of centralized control across
a large organization.
Students are less accustomed to identifying client business interests, as distinct from their legal problems, and I therefore allocate
class time to teasing them out in advance of the exercise. Woolley alludes to a subset of these concepts in what might be thought of as the

182

See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 (N.J. 1985). Put-

ting it in less benign terms, the employer may have intentionally hoped that adoption of an employee-friendly manual would help forestall unionization of its workers.
See id. at 1264.
183 See FREDERICK F. REICHHELD, THE LOYALTY EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND
GROWTH, PROFITS, AND LASTING VALUE

19-21 (1996) (advocating a loyalty-based man-

agement approach focusing on retention of customers, employees and investors as
key to long-term value creation); Stacey Wagner, Retention: Finders, Keepers, TRAINING
& DEv., Aug. 2000, at 64 (noting that positive working relationships and personal investments between employers and employees are known to improve productivity and
profit margins). On the subject of handbooks in particular, see, for example, Rachel
Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks: The Creation of a
Common Law Information-ElicitingPenalty Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 695, 721
(2005) (noting the "[c]onventional corporate wisdom" that employee handbooks
produce a "sense of shared knowledge [that] boosts workplace morale and workplace productivity by giving employees confidence that employers uniformly apply
company policies"); Anne Ciesla Bancroft, Give that Handbook a Hand: Employee Handbooks Deserve both Applause and Attention-Keep Them Up to Date, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.Apr. 2005, at 27 (2005) (suggesting that employee handbooks can raise employee
morale and help prevent unionization by highlighting favorable employee benefits
and presenting a positive company image); Mike Johnson, Good Policies Lead to a BiasFree Workplace, TRIBUNE BuS. WKLY., Jan. 20, 2003, at 1 (discussing the causal link between standard policies appearing in an employee handbook and lower discrimination in the workplace and, therefore, higher employee productivity and morale).
184

SeeJoseph W. R. Lawson II, Give Your Employees a Hand (Book), 6 LEGAL

MGMT.

24, 28-29 (1999) (employee handbooks promote consistency in handling human resource issues, communicate vital information to employees, save time for management, and help the firm comply with federal and state law); Maureen E. McClain,
Handling Wrongful Termination Claims 2001; What Plaintiffs and Defendants Have to
Know, 650 PRAC. L. INST./LIT. 111, 114 (2001) (employee handbooks promote consistent administration of policy which increases employee morale and manager confidence in applying company policy).

HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 489 2009

490

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 39:447

"policy" portions of the decision. 81 To carry discussion beyond the
text, I simply ask students, "Why do you think the employer adopted
this manual in the first place?" The answer is as critical as the legal
rule in going forward into the exercise, but one entirely foreign to
students who are accustomed to looking at the consequences of parties' actions rather than the rationale for taking them. Were it not
for the benefits the employer receives from the manual, it would
make no sense to have one at all in light of the risk of contractual liability. Balancing that risk against the client's goals is ultimately the
exercise's core.
The final product for the assignment consists of two documents:
a revised draft of the handbook and a cover memo to the client detailing the proposed changes and the rationale behind them. Students complete the drafting work outside of class. Thus, only the
presentation of the exercise and the post-completion debriefing
compete with doctrinal material for instructional time. 186 In terms of

assessment, I have administered the exercise both on a graded and
pass/fail basis. 18 7 When administering the exercise for a grade, I use

a rubric that evaluates the scope and effectiveness of the revisions
themselves as well as the quality and sophistication of the client
memo."" All students in the group get the same grade, which I count
185 This offers yet another illustration of the differences between advocacy
and

transactional thinking. Students have come to think of policy considerations as the
gravy on a meaty argument, but "policy" discussion in cases ultimately reflects concerns about how particular rules will affect different constituencies. Such judicial
discussions therefore offer a valuable data source for mining and understanding client interests and concerns. Cf. Dauer, supra note 7, at 493 (stating that the difference between "policy" issues and client issues is that "policy is not about clients oneat-a-time; it is about social groups a million or two at a time").
186 This Article addresses the issue of time management
and the competing demands on the basic course in greater detail infra Part V.A.
187 Both methods have advantages, but ultimately,
grading is the better course,
albeit more time consuming for the professor. See infra Part V.A.
188 The issue of assessment in legal education is a broad
topic beyond the scope of
this Article. See generally THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 162-84. Briefly, my
process for assessing the handbook revisions consists of examining whether students
have addressed the four key areas where editing or additional language is required: I
look to see if they have modified (1) the title and purpose of the handbook, (2) the
bases for termination, and (3) the disciplinary procedures policy, and I look for (4)
the addition of a disclaimer that meets the criteria as set out in Woolley. I assign between zero and five points on each of these components of the revisions, bearing in
mind such things as the clarity of the language used and the degree to which the
language actually accomplishes one or more of the client goals. In assessing the client memo, I similarly assign points, albeit based on a more intangible set of criteria.
These include the writing mechanics and style, the thoroughness of the content, the
accuracy and appropriateness of any references to law, and the degree to which the
memo demonstrates an awareness of its audience and the competing concerns of the
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as approximately fifteen percent of the final grade for the course. I
require students to complete an exercise assessment form for my own
edification as well as a teammate assessment form, which I hope
serves as a modest deterrent to would-be shirkers.
C. Lessons Learned
What does this exercise accomplish? Exposure to drafting-the
"skills" lesson-is only one piece of the students' pedagogical experience. In addition to this simulated "practice" component, the assignment re-teaches the analytical lessons learned in the first year of
law school and reinforced through much of the curriculum, albeit
with a transactional perspective.
1. Creating Facts from Law
A key aspect of the assignment is learning how to apply the law
in practice in a way that differs from the type of rule application in
which students engage when responding to exam questions and classroom hypotheticals. By the second year, students are adept at analyzing how the law will apply to a set of facts and formulating arguments
for and against a particular outcome.189 However, as legal education
critics have pointed out, facts do not arrive in ready-made packages;
they must be ferreted out by the lawyer.'90

client. For other examples of other faculty's methods for evaluating written and
skills oriented exercises, see, for example, Daniel L. Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of
the Legal Writing Course: The Theory and Methodology of Analytical Critique, 38 U. TOL. L.
REv. 651, 659-74 (2007) (proposing techniques for effective feedback on student
drafted assignments that emphasize tailored and appropriately detailed commentary
drawing on class discussion and prioritizing defects in legal analysis); Michael J.
Madison, Writing to Learn Law and Writing in Law: An Intellectual Property Illustration,52
ST. Louis U. L.J. 823, 834-35 (2008) (explaining use of a ten-point scale to assess
composition and substantive elements of student memos in an intellectual property
course); Sophie M. Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve Teaching by Using RubricsExplicit Grading Criteria,2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 32-37 (2004) (explaining a method
of developing grading rubrics with specific criteria and point values and advantages
of using same for assessing exam performance).
189
See Brest, supra note 39, at 7 (1995) ("The case method teaches problem solving by asking ... [g]iven this set of facts and these precedents, what are the rights
and liabilities of the parties?"); Stark, supra note 37, at 224 ("[W]e teach students to
The paratake the law and apply it to the facts to create a persuasive argument ....
digm is one in which the litigators seek a certain legal result by working backwards
from the law to a static set of facts.").
190
See Brest, supra note 39, at 7 ("[T]he case method of instruction is limited by
the inexorable fact that appellate cases embody static situations with determinate
facts."); Dauer, supra note 7, at 486 (describing preventive law practice as "[c] reating
institutions and arrangements on a clean napkin" as opposed to litigation "in which
the boundaries of a problem are to a considerable degree preset").
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The lawyer in such critiques is implicitly a litigator.'0 ' True, the
facts do not lay themselves out on a conference table, neatly arranged
to trigger particular legal questions, but for the litigator they exist to
be "discovered." This is not to diminish the indeterminate nature of
what the litigator will find. He or she will have to parse through different versions of events, contend with foggy or selective recollections, weigh the possibility of bias, and perhaps form a moral judgment in shaping the facts into a particular narrative. 11 2 But the
relevant events have happened.
In contrast, the transactional lawyer deals in a world in which
there are no facts-yet. 193 Whereas the litigator is part sleuth, part
sculptor, the transactional lawyer is the inventor of the raw material.
It is herjob to create the facts using the rule of law as a baseline and a
boundary. In its baseline function, the law provides the basic tools
that the lawyer will use to achieve desired results. In the ordinary
business contract scenario, such "tools" include representations and
warranties, covenants, and conditions. 94 By analogy, the relevant legal tool in the handbook exercise is the disclaimer. It is this drafting
technique that allows the employer to create its desired protection
against an adverse legal result. But the role of law is not only functional, it is also a constraint on interests. The transactional lawyer
structures the relationship and papers the deal to stay within the law,
but with an eye toward maximizing client gain. In the case of an employee handbook, that means offering the client the basic language it
needs for protection, while at the same time sanctioning some degree
of promissory language in order to achieve the client's business goal
of fostering a positive work environment. Absent this, the "deal" is
not valuable for the client. '5

191

See e.g., Sokolow, supra note 177, at 970 ("During the negotiating process, dur-

ing settlement talks, or at trial, lawyers must first discover the facts before they can
map out strategies or formulate defenses for their clients.").
2 See id. at 975.
193
See Brest, supra note 39, at 7 ("By contrast [to what is taught through the case
method], lawyers in everyday practice are called upon to help clients arrange their
future affairs in dynamically changing situations where the facts, as well as the law,
are anything but determinate.").
194
Professor Tina Stark refers to these as "the contract's building blocks." See
Stark, supra note 37, at 225.
195 The seminal work on value creation through
transactional lawyering is Ronald
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239
(1984), which deals with the different but analogous context of a capital asset pricing
in the context of a business to business transaction. This Article explores the analogy
further infra Part IV.CA.
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To students, the notion of creating facts from law is perspective
shifting and empowering. The construct offers a counter framework
for evaluating the facts they read in reported cases. Facts are not
simply crafted into a legal theory of a case at the point of dispute.
Where sophisticated parties are concerned, the facts as often as not
were designed by lawyers with the law in mind. It is the creative task
of forming relationships and attempting to engineer desired results
that makes transactional law attractive to those who practice it. The
exercise allows students to experience some of the satisfaction of being in the role of an enabler rather than in the stop-loss posture of an
advocate. 196
More importantly, engineering facts in the face of legal boundaries reveals a more nuanced picture of the client's interest. Within
the context of an adversarial proceeding, the client's goal is to win
(whether that means receiving a favorable judgment or reaching a satisfactory settlement), and the lawyer obliges by making the best legal
arguments that the existing facts enable. This often means lawyering
from the extremes. Thus, in the case of a breach of contract action
based on an employee handbook, the lawyer for the employer will argue that the manual provided no basis for employee expectations,
that the employer never made or intended any promise, and that
even if it had, the employer has the unilateral right to alter its procedures and policies.
The difference is that in the planning posture, the lawyer is not
just thinking about a legal outcome, but must also think about business issues, which are often in tension with legal interests. That is
very much the case in the handbook situation where, as described
previously, the interest in using the manual as a managerial tool is at
197
I reiterate to stuodds with the employer's desire to avoid liability.

dents during the course of the exercise that their task is not to eliminate the risk of contractual liability, which is impossible in any event,
but to best serve the client's interest. 198 Achieving the most for the

196

The frequent colloquial characterization of transactional lawyers as "deal mak-

ers" and litigators as those who "clean up" after them, is a propos here. Cf Brest, supra note 39, at 7 ("[I]f one looks back to the origin of many cases, the parties were
not contestants at all. Rather, they were individuals or entities seeking counsel in arranging their personal or business affairs or resolving a nascent dispute. In some instances, the very fact that litigation ensued signals a failure of their lawyers' judgment
or skill.").
197 See supra Part IV.B.
198 Cf Dauer, supra note 65, at 19 (A core principle of preventive law is that "the
optimal management of legal risk is seldom achieved by driving one of its components to zero.").
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client on both fronts means the lawyer will not be drafting a document that falls well outside the bounds of contract, the kind of
document that would make litigators' work easy. Rather the transactional lawyer wants to play right along the boundary where it can remain safe from contractual liability but preserve the meaning of the
document.199 The worst possible result is a handbook so full of disclaimers and ambivalent statements as to be utterly functionless. °°
The challenge is finding a comfortable place in the middle.
2.

It's Different (Drafting) in Real Life
Of course, saying and doing are a universe apart. The drafting
component of the assignment demonstrates to students how difficult
it is to effectuate in writing what they envision in their heads. This
reality gap is one they have encountered in the context of framing legal arguments: they have already experienced the difference between
articulating an idea in class and actually developing it in a brief or on
an exam, but most have not had a comparable experience in a transactional context. When they learn that the assignment does not require (and indeed prohibits) research, they expect it to be relatively
simple. They invariably report in debriefing the exercise that it

Framing the task in this way not only focuses and hones student drafting,
it is
likely to spur discussion about the lawyer's role. Students may be concerned that effectuating the client's dual goals will result in a document that is misleading to workers, or that this is perhaps the client's intent. Such a realization offers one of many
opportunities to engage issues of professionalism and the rules of ethics in the context of the exercise. Students should realize that the rules of ethics do not prohibit
this type of drafting. The lawyer owes no duty to the client's workforce, the handbook is not a court document, and there is no misrepresentation. That conclusion,
however, does not address the degree to which students may find the endeavor unsettling, nor does it dictate that they go about their business disregarding the possible consequences of their work. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2
(2004) ("It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice . . .[such] considerations impinge upon most legal questions
and may decisively influence how the law will be applied."). A full treatment of the
ethical and professional issues that arise in the face of legally sanctioned but morally
troubling conduct is beyond the scope of this Article. However, on the particular
question of misleading language in an employee handbook, it can be helpful to remind students that the legal standard for determining the employer's contractual
liability is the "reasonable expectations" of the employees. The document that truly
misleads the worker will also fail the employer. For a useful discussion of the gap between law and justice, as well as guidance for discussing such issues with clients, see
generally Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyer's Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S.
TEX. L. REv. 181 (1999).
200 Indeed, such a result is worse than no
handbook at all in that it is likely to be
confusing to the employee and, by virtue of its existence, still leave the employer at
risk of suit.
199
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proved significantly more difficult and time consuming than they initially expected.2 °1
Like any exercise in legal writing, part of the challenge, and
hence the value, derives from legal complexity. The process of rule
application forces a much closer examination of the rules themselves
than can be achieved in reading cases and articulating holdings. This
is why the hypothetical question is considered the signature pedagogy
of law school. 202 The process, depending on how the instructor formulates the questions, can illuminate either the forest or the trees.
Thus, a particular fact pattern may highlight the individual elements
of a multi-part test or it may introduce issues governed by rules other
than those in the case immediately at hand, forcing students to integrate other sources of authority.
The same set of benefits accrues in the transactional exercise. It
is easy enough to understand that a handbook must contain a disclaimer in order to avoid contractual obligation. But what exactly
should the disclaimer say? Examining the language in Woolley with an
eye toward drafting reveals that, to be effective, a disclaimer must
have several components: a declaration of at-will status, a disclaimer
of the manual's contractual significance, and a reservation of the
02
Subsequent case law to which
employer's right to modify its terms.

students are exposed further interprets Woolley to require that the
disclaimer be prominently placed and comprehensible to the employee.2 a That is a lot for the drafter to carry off, particularly in light
of the client's directive that the manual be employee-friendly and
2005
morale-enhancing.
201See

Consolidated Student Comments Fall 2007-Spring 2008 (on file with au-

thor).
202 THE CARNEGIE REPORT,

supra note 1, at 47-51.
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985).
204 See Evenson v. Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 402, 409 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993); Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. 1994); Sanchez v. Life Care Ctrs., 855 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1993).
205It is for this reason that I have come to view the disclaimer proviso in the WoolLeyopinion as somewhat tongue-and-cheek. It seems highly unlikely that an employer
would be willing to include the literal language the court proposes. See Woolley 491
A.2d at 1271 ("[R]egardless of what the manual says or provides, the employer promises nothing and remains free to change wages and all other working conditions
without having to consult anyone and without anyone's agreement."). Certainly this
is no "simple" addition to the handbook as the court suggests. See id. Furthermore,
it is difficult to imagine that the New Jersey Supreme Court, well known for its progressive and pro-worker impulses, would set forth this important cause of action in
an explicitly policy-based decision only to undercut everything it had penned in the
final paragraph of the opinion. The better understanding of the proviso is that the
court was offering one final chastisement to the defendant for wanting things both
203Woolley
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Identifying and complying with these individual elements, however, is only one aspect of the assignment. Students must also fold in
the holding of Conner, which denied summary judgment to the employer in a case involving a manual that appeared to have the requisite disclaimers in abundance.0 6 Connerforces a reevaluation of the
hierarchy of legal rules. Students tend to walk away from doctrinal
instruction on handbooks with the impression that the disclaimer is
the key proxy for determining contractual liability. But a disclaimer
is simply that-a clause that disclaims contractual commitment. It is
important to keep in mind what makes a handbook a binding contract in the first place, which is the affirmative language regarding
discipline and termination. After all, there is no contract without a
promise. The take-away in terms of rule application is that an employer who wishes to avoid liability must not only disclaim contractual
commitment but also eliminate from the handbook any promissory
language that might conflict with the disclaimer.
Ultimately, the students must successfully edit, as well as supplement, handbook language, consistent with both the law and the
client's competing interest in maintaining a useful document. Further, they must accomplish these tasks as a group. Students at times
have reported frustration, beyond the usual dissatisfaction with group
assignments, at the diversity of opinion generated within the group
on the wording of the revision. °7 This is part of the exercise design.
The confluence of ideas within the group simulates the experience of
working with other attorneys (and the client) on a shared case or project. 20

It also illustrates concretely the elusive nature of the legal

standard, which determines contractual status based on the reasonable expectations of the employee. 2 9 The range of opinions within
student groups likely accords with the range of perspectives reasonable employees will have when reading the manual and to which the
employer must be sensitive. Finally, the variety of student opinions
should offer the group a set of options as to where to strike the balance between managerial interests and risk avoidance. Even if all
ways-to realize the morale benefits its employee-friendly handbook would provide
while remaining free to abide by it or not as it saw fit.
206 See Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 560
S.E.2d 606, 611 (S.C. 2002).
207
See Consolidated Comments, supranote 201.
See Brest, supra note 39, at 15 ("From the moment they
enter practice, lawyers
spend much of their time working collaboratively with others, including clients,
other lawyers, legal assistants, and professionals in other fields ....
Yet law schools
have not traditionally offered students many opportunities to work collaboratively, let
alone to reflect systematically on their successes and failures in team efforts.").
2W See Woolley, 491 A.2d
at 1264.
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students agree that certain language risks creating employee expectations, for instance about the security of their jobs, they may disagree
to eliminate that language given the emas to whether they ought
210
interests.
ployer's other
3.

Lawyering as a Balancing Act

At the end of the day (and to the great relief of the students), it
is the client who decides what is in its best interest. This aspect of the
exercise provides a context for understanding an important value of
the profession-that the lawyer is merely the enabler of the client's
wishes rather than the actual decision maker.2 1 The exercise clarifies
the boundaries of the lawyer's role while illustrating the way in which
the lawyer facilitates client choice.1 Students should use the memo
as an opportunity to provide the client with options where they are
uncertain about the client's priorities, as well as to acknowledge the
risks and limitations of the option they recommend. In this way, the
process of generating content for the memo forces students to as213
In addition, through draftsume the role of counselor and advisor.
ing the final product, students gain an exposure to a writing style that
differs significantly from what they have experienced in the typical
21 4
legal writing class focusing on research memos and briefs.
Ideally, the process of proposing and weighing alternatives also
provides an experience analogous to contract negotiation. In the
handbook exercise, and in much of the transactional work subsumed
within employment law, there is only one represented party engaged
See Brest, supra note 39, at 15 ("[D]rafting provides students with a sense of the
inherent ambiguity and vagueness of language and, indeed, of what [has been]
called the 'indeterminacy of aim' that characterizes our vision of the future.") (citing
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw, 125-26 (1961)). This Article further explores
the topic of drafting in a state of uncertainty infra Part IV.C.3.
211 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
212 See id. R. 1.2(a) cmt. ("The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by the law and
the lawyer's professional obligations. Within those limits, a client also has a right to
consult with the lawyer about the means.., used in pursuing those objectives.").
213 See Brest, supra note 39, at 15 ("The form of writing distinctive to counseling is
the memorandum to a client analyzing his or her problem and setting out and evaluDrafting such documents calls for imaginaating alternative courses of action ....
tion in predicting different ways in which the future may unfold and for creativity
and strategic choices about the precision or open-endedness of language.").
214 Id. (asserting that the type of writing distinctive to client counseling "requir[es]
students to analyze a set of facts (not already homogenized, as they typically are in
appellate writing assignments) in terms of both legal and nonlegal considerations,
and to present options and recommendations in nontechnical language").
210
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in planning-the employer. Yet students are essentially serving two
masters inasmuch as their charge is to balance the employer's competing legal and business interests. As noted previously, the options
they generate as a group will likely form a continuum between two
contrasting positions-the handbook language that most instills positive workplace morale and the handbook language that most reduces
the risk of legal liability.
This in turn provides students with insight into the way compromise is generated in any business transaction on risk allocation issues. For instance, a buyer and seller negotiating a sale of goods may
have competing views about how their agreement should account for
the risk of a delay in the delivery of the merchandise. The seller
might desire a strong force majeure clause that includes a detailed
but non-exhaustive list of circumstances that will excuse delay in performance. By contrast, the buyer will want a clause making time "of
the essence" and recognizing no excuse for deviation.
The result in
most transactions involving players of equal bargaining power will be
something between the two extremes, perhaps sanctioning "reasonable" delays or parroting the basic legal standard for excuse by supervening events.2 16 An analogous compromise will likely result during
the students' process of creating the handbook. Perhaps the best
employee handbook is one that includes the requisite disclaimers,
but does so using friendly, non-legal language that avoids any promise of job security, but expresses the "hope" that workers will have a
long future with the company. My own hope is that in the process of
reaching this version, students will come to understand the range of
options they can offer the client, as well as why the end result is often
a somewhat dissatisfying middle ground.
Ultimately, the exercise is about using professional judgment to
plot a course of action in the face of uncertainty. Professors constantly remind students that there are no "right answers" in law
school. Generally, what they mean is that given the mutability of
rules in a precedential system, and the reality that no two sets of facts
are completely alike, one can never definitively predict how a court
will apply the law in a particular case. But the world of the transactional lawyer is significantly more uncertain than this. In addition to
Cf Stark, supra note 37, at 226-27 (using continuum of possible "no
litigation"
clauses in context of sale of company to exemplify the skill of translating client risk
allocation preferences into legal language).
216 See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2005) (allowing
excuse of performance "if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made").
25
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the slippery task of predicting legal results, he or she must account
needs. 2, 7
for the client's fluctuating and indeterminate business
Thus, in the handbook context, the ultimate legal question is how
much promissory language will trigger a question of fact on the
document's contractual enforceability. Determining how far to push
the envelope on this open question requires a prediction as to where
a court will draw the line between aspirational and binding language.
But it also requires the lawyer to assess the degree of risk that is appropriate for a client to take on this matter given its liability concerns
and its interest in having a useful manual. In other words, contending with uncertainty for the deal lawyer means facilitating a critical
business choice. The transactional lawyer must intersect legal predicgoals to
tions with an understanding of the client's own competing
218
interest.
best
overall
its
in
is
what
decide
help the client
4.

Adding Value (A.KA. Earning Your Keep)

Of course, there are also limits on the degree to which the lawyer can rely on the client to identify its own interests. The lawyer
brings professional expertise to the table and presumably has the
ability to identify pitfalls that the client might otherwise overlook. In
the transactional literature this component of the lawyer's role, the
value added to the transaction, has garnered significant scholarly attention and has obvious practical significance. 2' 9 A lawyer who does
nothing more than facilitate a transaction is a mere intermediary
whose services increase the total cost of the deal. 220 Thus, identifying
and augmenting value is of supreme importance to clients as well as a
matter of self-preservation for the profession. While scholars have

217

Myers, supra note 6, at 419 ("Students [think] that clients present matters to

lawyers in relatively neat packages, that situations are static.... In practice, however,
situations are much more fluid."); see also Brest, supra note 39, at 8 ("[A] good lawyer
must be able to counsel clients and serve their interests beyond the confines of his
technical expertise-to integrate legal considerations with the business, personal,
political, and other nonlegal aspects of the matter.").
21
Brest, supra note 39, at 8 ("[G]ood lawyers bring more to bear on a problem
than legal knowledge and lawyering skills. They bring creativity, common sense,
practical wisdom, and that most precious of attributes, good judgment.").
219 See, e.g., RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 244 (1984); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of
TransactionalLauyering, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 486, 487-88 (2007); Mark C. Schuman, The Hired Gun as Facilitator:Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 681 (1996).
220 See Gilson, supra note 219, at 241 ("Business lawyers are seen
at best as a transaction cost.... ").
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theorized the transactional lawyer's role in a variety of ways," ' most
descriptions fit comfortably within the idea that the transactional lawyer's value-added is his or her ability to anticipate and reduce legal or
business
risks of which the client was unaware or was unable to elimi22
nate. 1

The revision exercise gives students a taste of that role by leaving a key issue unstated. The client's request is that the attorney revise the manual; the client does not explicitly ask how the new manual should be implemented in the workplace. Yet the way in which
the employer distributes the manual has important legal implications.
As students know from DeMasse v. ITT Corp., at least some jurisdictions will decline to recognize the validity of the employer's unilateral
modification absent "new" consideration and assent beyond continued employment. 223 Thus, whether a court accepts the students' revisions as effectively eliminating any prior legal commitment will ultimately hinge on this issue. Selecting a method of disseminating the
revised manual implicates business concerns as well. If the client
must supply new consideration, it will have to decide how much it can
afford to spend in providing additional benefits to its workers. The
client must also account for logistical considerations, such as any administrative difficulty that might inhere in providing new consideration or securing employee signatures or other manifestations of assent. Finally, there is always the risk that efforts to secure knowing
consent will emphasize the adverse change in the manual, thus sending a negative message to workers and defeating the client's goal of
maintaining strong workplace morale.
Students are explicitly told that DeMasse is one of only three cases they can consider in completing the revision exercise, and almost
all students include a reservation of the employer's right to modify
terms of the manual in their recommended disclaimer language. Yet
only a few students recognize that the addition of that language itself
falls within the DeMasse paradigm-they are turning a manual that
2
See id. at 255 (positing that transactional lawyers add value by reducing transaction costs by structuring deals to create appropriate incentives and reduce moral hazard); Schwarcz, supra note 219, at 500 (arguing that transactional lawyers add value
principally by reducing regulatory costs); Schuman, supra note 219, at 709 (contending that lawyers reduce transaction costs and thus add value by minimizing uncer-

tainty).

See Stark, supra note 37, at 228 ("'Adding value to the deal' is a euphemism for
'finding and resolving business issues.'").
223 See DeMasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Ariz. 1999) ("[C] ontinued employment alone is not sufficient consideration to support a modification to an impliedin-fact contract."); see also supraPart IV.A.
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provides job security (a benefit to the employee) into one that restores the at-will regime (a benefit to the employer). W"rhen debriefing the exercise, students invariably protest that they were never
asked to advise on implementation, and to some extent I bear that in
mind when assessing this aspect of the exercise. But the fact that students were not asked specifically to do this is precisely the point, and
the widespread oversight of this issue offers the ultimate teachable
moment as to what it means for transactional lawyers to practice law
proactively.
V.

VALUING AND ENABLING INTEGRATIVE TEACHING

The previous Part explained how one can implement the employment as transaction theory in the basic employment law course,
as well as the pedagogical value in doing so. Its goal was to provide
faculty with the information necessary to carry out a transactional exercise should they be persuaded to adopt this form of teaching.
Adapting a course to incorporate such techniques requires nothing
other than a willingness to sacrifice some amount of substantive coverage and devote the additional out-of-class time needed to grade a
midterm assignment. Importantly, it does not require any structural
change in the law school curriculum. A great deal can be accomplished toward better preparing students for legal practice through
the concentrated efforts of professors in their own classrooms.
That said, there are ways in which the curriculum can change to
better support integrative teaching, as well as ways in which faculty
can do more to assist one another. This Article closes with preliminary thoughts about two developments that would strengthen efforts
in this direction: the allocation of additional credits to upper-level
substantive courses to enable the integration of practical training,
and a commitment by faculty to teaching self-consciously and sharing
their reflections with the academic community.
A.

The Casefor a Four-(or Five-) Credit Hybrid

My experience with the handbook revision exercise demonstrates that doctrinal faculty can successfully incorporate a transactional skills component into a basic three-credit course. Yet there are
many limitations to that structure. To fully realize the pedagogical
value of the revision experience would require devoting significant
class time beyond what I currently allot in my course. In an ideal
situation, prior to the out-of-class component of the exercise, the professor should engage students in a preliminary in-class discussion
about how to approach the exercise, fielding ideas about what areas
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of the handbook need to be revised and how. He or she would then
allow students in-class time to discuss the issues raised during the
class discussion in their assigned groups, before sending them off to
actually produce the revised draft and memo out of class. The professor should also allot more time to debriefing the exercise after
completion in order to allow for in-class review and critique of the
students' proposed revisions. Finally, he or she should send students
back to the drafting table to revise their revisions following the inclass review.
To minimize the loss in substantive coverage, I take various short
cuts in administering the exercise. In contrast to the description
above, I limit preliminary class discussion to my expectations and requirements of the exercise, the group activity occurs almost exclusively outside of class, debriefing focuses broadly on the outcomes of
the exercise and students' experiences rather than providing a careful critique of individual revision efforts, and there is no re-write.
While I believe, and student feedback confirms, that the exercise is
still extremely valuable, students are somewhat short-changed. 224 For

many, this is the one and only transactional skills experience of their
law school careers and their sole exposure to drafting a document
2 25
other than a memo or brief.

A more supportive structure for integrative teaching would allot
an additional credit (or more) to each upper-level course for the
purpose of incorporating a thorough skills experience. In terms of
the employment law course, students would have one additional class
meeting per week devoted to application of substantive material in a
practical context. 226 This would include not only an extended version
of the handbook revision exercise, but also other problem-solving exercises. For instance, with more credit hours the professor might ask
students to draft or revise an employee noncompete or arbitration
agreement, prepare an opinion letter assessing whether a particular
set of workers are exempt from mandatory overtime pay, or negotiate

See Consolidated Comments, supranote 201.
Indeed there is a chicken and egg problem at work here. Presumably,
faculty
would be more willing to engage students in transactional exercises if doing so were
not so time-consuming. If more faculty members conducted exercises like this, students would have the cognitive framework and practical experience to complete any
one assignment more independently and efficiently.
26
This model tracks the structure of the Integrated Transactional Program, described previously, in which students participate in a traditional class meeting (in either trusts and estates or professional responsibility) and as well as participate in a
weekly skills session. See Myers, supra note 6, at 406-07.
224
25
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and severance provisions of an executive employthe termination
227
ment contract.

A comprehensive proposal for curricular reform is beyond the
scope of this project. However, there are many benefits to incorporating the multi-credit hybrid structure as a central component of any
new curriculum. The most important of these is the unique ability of
a hybrid course to connect practical training to substantive law. The
hybrid approach directly addresses the Carnegie Report's principal
point-that law school untenably divides the cognitive and practical
apprenticeships of professional education. 8 In this way, it is more
responsive to the insights of the report than many of the more wide229
scale proposals that have been publicized in its aftermath.

The

point of the Carnegie Report is not merely that students need more
skills training, but that skills instruction must be mainstreamed into
the core of law school pedagogy.2 ° Only by demonstrating how these
bodies of learning bear on one another can we expect students to develop professional competence.
In fact, it is possible to envision a reformed curriculum in which
the multi-credit hybrid would be the default course structure among
227 For examples of such problems, see GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN,
supra
note 123, at 3, 62, 166, 722. Of course, such exercise need not only be transactional
in nature. For an illustration of how one might incorporate a litigation experience
into a basic employment course, see Richard A. Bales, Conference Materials, Pedagogical Methods for Teaching Labor and Employment Law in the 21st Century, Se.
Ass'n of Law Schools Ann. Meeting, Palm Beach, FL (August 1, 2008) (on file with
author).

228
29

See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 189; supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Overhauling Law School's Third Year, INSIDE

HIGHER ED

(March 12, 2008), available at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/12/
thirdyear (describing Washington & Lee's new curriculum which "replac[es] all academic courses in the third year of its program with 'experiential' courses in which
students will perform work equivalent to that done by lawyers"); Katherine Mangan,
New HampshireAllows Law Students to Demonstrate Court Skills in Lieu of BarExam, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2008, at 2 (describing program of the New

Hampshire bar and Franklin Pierce Law School that allows students to bypass the bar
examination by taking a "series of specialized courses and activities on top of the
core classes required of all students" that focus on litigation and trial preparation
skills); see also Robel, supranote 5 (discussing Indiana University School of Law's new
"economics and values of the profession" course that will be required in the first
year). This is not to say that such reforms are not valuable in their own right; certainly they do much to address law schools' weaknesses in practical training generally. But, as described, they do not appear to respond to the particular need for an
integrative law school experience.
See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the report's peda-

gogical concern as "how to bring the teaching and learning of legal doctrine into
more fruitful dialogue with the pedagogies of practice"); supra Part II.A.
231 See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supranote
1, at 12.
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law schools' upper-level offerings. The typical law school course of
study for the second and third year posits the purely doctrinal course
as the standard platform for instruction with skills courses as optional, add-on components. Instead, the assumption might be that all
upper-level courses have both doctrinal and pragmatic components.
That is not to say that stand-alone skills experiences should be eliminated. Clinics, externships, practicum courses, and other intensive
exposures form a critical, indeed irreplaceable, part of the curriculum. The point rather is that we cannot wholly outsource practical
instruction to those programs. Legal knowledge and legal skill are
intimately related and equally important for professional success.
Finally, the multi-credit hybrid approach is sensitive to the economics of curricular choice. An educational model that relies on this
course structure does not entail expenditures for new programs nor
does it necessarily require additional faculty. 32 Existing faculty would
teach more work-intensive courses, but assuming the appropriate
33
credit allocation, they would teach fewer of them.

232 It is possible that schools could make fruitful use of adjunct
practitioners to
assist in assessing written work or contributing to other aspects of the skills component of such courses. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 491 (describing how the Columbia deals course, in which students review real transaction documents, incorporates presentations by the local attorneys that brokered those transactions). A
thorough assessment of the most effective and economical means of staffing such
courses is beyond the scope of this project. It is important to note, however, that integrative teaching requires an integrated faculty. The CarnegieReport recognizes that
law schools' common reliance on non-tenure track teachers to staff the curriculum's
skills offerings is a reflection of how the legal academy devalues this aspect of education. See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 189. To put the point more affirmatively, student learning is enriched where faculty demonstrate expertise in both theory and practice. For these reasons, as well as others documented by legal scholars,
this Article does not support the proliferation of full-time, semi-permanent nontenure track teaching positions to address deficits in faculty resources. See, e.g., Marina Angel, The Glass Ceilingfor Women in Legal Education: Contract Positions and the
Death of Tenure, 50J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (2000).
233 To be clear, this Article does not mean to
suggest that the resource allocation
issues can be uniformly addressed by allocating a set amount number of credits to
each (formerly) "doctrinal" class. Law schools will need to assess and determine
what constitutes a skills experience, what amount of skills instruction justifies credit
augmentation, whether student performance in experiential components of basic
courses should be separately assessed, and a host of other related academic matters.
Separate discussions may also be required to determine how such teaching is valued
in fulfillment of faculty members' required teaching load. For instance, the number
of students enrolled in these courses will likely be a consideration in assigning teaching loads, given the close student contact and additional assessment required of faculty teaching skills in their substantive courses. All of these matters require significant study, and perhaps trial and error, and are therefore beyond the scope of this
Article.
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On Becoming a Teacher-Scholar

Another implication of this Article is that the worlds of doctrine,
theory, and practice are not so far apart. From a functional perspective, the transactional exercise provides an example of the integration
of substantive teaching and practical training. But it also relies on an
underlying jurisprudential theory and emerging scholarly trend. The
private turn in employment law jurisprudence coupled with the insights of new intitutionalist scholars justify the focus on transactional
234
law practice as a central site for experiential learning. Just as practice and substance are intricately related to one another, so is scholarship and pedagogy.
In the same vein, it behooves us as faculty to consider teachingboth the substance and methodology of what goes on in the classroom-with the intellectual rigor generally reserved for scholarship.3 5 What has been called the "Scholarship of Teaching and
Learning" has a long tradition among academics and has been recognized in recent decades as a critical component of the work that
faculty do.23 6 Such scholarship seeks to create a "teaching commons"
by bringing to the public discourse the "intellectual work that is regularly being done" in the classroom.237 As yet however, the tradition
has made only modest inroads into the legal academy.238
This Article is not the place to speculate as to why law professors
are latecomers to the movement, nor to wade into the debate over

234

235

See supraPart IIL.B.
See MARY TAYLOR HUBER & PAT

HUTCHINGS, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING: BUILDING THE TEACHING

COMMONS 18 (2005) (suggesting that "all faculty" should "bring their habits, methods, and commitments as scholars to their work as teachers-and to their students'
learning.").
236 See ERNEST L. BOYER, supra note 8; see also HUBER
& HUTCHINGS, supra note 235,
at 17 (describing past research and teaching traditions that have contributed to the
emergence of the field).
237 See HUBER & HUTCHINGS, supra note 235, at 18 (quoting Dan Bernstein,
Representing the Intellectual Work in Teaching Through Peer-Reviewed Course Portfolios, in THE
TEACHING OF PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILBERTJ. McKEACHIE AND CHARLES L.

BREWER (Davis & Buskist eds., 2001)).
238 For some examples of law school-related work in this tradition, see
Andrea A.
Curcio et al., Does PracticeMake Perfect? An EmpiricalExamination of the Impact of Practice
Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 271 (2008); Larry 0. Natt
Gantt, II, DeconstructingThinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive Components of the
Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 413 (2007); and Alice M. Thomas, Laying the
Foundationfor Better Student Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Incorporatingan Integrated Theory of Legal Education into DoctrinalPedagogy, 6 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 49 (2000).
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what constitutes academic scholarship. 239 The point rather is that serious, reflective assessment of our work in the classroom enriches our
experience as both educators and scholars and, further, that public
exposition of such endeavors is an obligation we owe our colleagues
and institutions. I will teach my class better having written this Article, and I hope others will teach better having read it.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has presented a new pedagogical perspective on
teaching employment law, one based on the theme of employment as
transaction. While employment litigation is an ever growing part of
the judicial docket, a significant portion of the practice of employment law focuses on the ex ante creation of employment relationships and compliance with legal mandates. Developments in employment law jurisprudence reveal increased judicial deference to
private ordering in assessing rights and liabilities in the workplace,
and a growing area of employment law scholarship has exposed the
critical role that institutional actors play-employers, their lawyers,
and other agents-in the realization of workplace rights. It is time to
give these concepts a more prominent place in the classroom.
Doing so necessarily requires more than teaching legal doctrine.
As the Carnegie Report confirms, the standard pedagogy of discerning
rules from cases and applying them to hypothetical fact patterns,
while valuable and necessary to cultivating legal analysis skills, cannot
alone prepare students for professional practice. This Article has
demonstrated that the integration of a realistic exercise into a basic
employment law class is a feasible undertaking that exposes students
to the much neglected area of transactional practice and makes a
significant stride toward bridging the persistent gap between legal
analysis and lawyering. Finally, this Article has proffered the multicredit hybrid course as the building block for an integrative upperlevel curriculum. By mainstreaming skills and teaching them in tandem with substantive material, we demonstrate how these segregated
components of the curriculum share space in the real world of legal
practice and hopefully offer students a better foundation for achieving professional competence when they leave our classrooms.

239

See HUBER & HUTCHINGS, supra note 235, at 30 (recognizing that the place of

teaching and learning scholarship in the academic reward system may well depend
on the extent to which such research "closely parallels the features of traditional
scholarship and leads to traditional forms of publication").
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